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USING THE ANGLO‐AMERICAN RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR PRINCIPLE
TO ASSIGN RESPONSIBILITY FOR WORKER STATUTORY BENEFITS AND
PROTECTIONS
Michael C. Harper*

Introduction
The common law remains an intellectual battle ground in Anglo‐
American legal systems, even in the current age of statutes. This is true
in significant part because the common law provides legitimacy for
arguments actually based on policy, ideology, and interest. It also is
true because of the common law’s malleability and related
susceptibility to significantly varied interpretations.
Mere contention over the meaning of the common law to provide
legitimacy for modern statutes is usually not productive of sensible
policy, however. It generally produces no more than reified doctrine
unsuited for problems the common law was not framed to solve. Yet,
when viewed more flexibly, not to find doctrinal rules, but rather to
*
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find insight from the collective judgment of judges about the weighing
of social values, examining the common law may have a different kind
of value for modern policy makers.
Both the misuse and the value of the common law are illustrated
by the attempts to define when workers are to be protected and
benefitted by employment statutes in both the United States (U.S.) and
the United Kingdom (U.K.), nations that proudly share a common law
tradition.1 The misuse is evident as the courts of each nation have
looked to the common law to provide legitimacy for formulaic
definitions that serve to set presumptive boundaries on those
protected by their employment statutes. The courts of each have
struggled both to make those boundaries clear and predictable, and
also to provide a compelling and coherent rationale for the boundaries
they have traced by common law formulas. American law has been
burdened by multifactor tests that do not explicitly focus on some
ultimate standard or principle, including any related to the need of
workers for coverage by employment statutes.2 U. K. law has
compounded this burden by doctrine derived from the common law of
1

I use the word worker rather than employee to avoid the current legal associations of the latter. The word worker
refers to those providing economic labor, rather or not recognized by the law currently or historically as
employees. For a probing history of the evolution in Britain of the variant relationships now arguably classified as
ones of employment, see Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market: Industrialization,
Employment and Legal Evolution (2005) esp. ch.2. See also Simon Deakin, Does the Personal Employment Contract
Provide a Basis for the Reunification of Employment Law, 36 Indus. L. J. 68, 72‐74 (2007).
2
See infra text accompanying notes 15‐36.
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contracts without explaining a rationale related to the purposes of its
employment laws, including the needs of its workers.3
Yet, judicial and legislative policy makers in each nation could be
set on a much more promising path by considering as a principle for
setting a default presumption of coverage an underlying rationale for
the common law that made relevant the initial distinction between
employees and independent contractors ‐‐ the common law of
vicarious liability through respondeat superior.4 This rationale is based
on the appropriateness of cost internalization where there is an
alignment of worker duties with employer interests. It presents a
socially compelling reason for assigning responsibility for workers’
benefits and protections to an employing entity, or entities, with
aligned interests, rather than to the workers or to the general society.5
While statutory protections and benefits should be based on
worker need, the alignment of worker duties with employer interests
provides a critical principle of economic fairness for assigning
responsibility for the protections and benefits. Where workers do not
have sufficient control over economic resources to work in their own
independent interests, rather than in line with those of some employer

3

See infra text accompanying notes 37‐73.
See infra text accompanying notes 74‐100.
5
See infra text accompanying notes 87‐94.
4
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or employers, they are in a position of greater need than those workers
who do have such control. Furthermore, in the absence of such
resource control, their duties will be aligned with the interests of
employers that presumptively should be responsible for the protections
and benefits offered by modern employment statutes.
This essay will explain how the common law of respondeat
superior is based on a principle that also can determine the assignment
of responsibility for benefits and protections set in modern
employment statutes.6 In its first section, the essay briefly recounts the
unfocused use of multifactor tests in the U. S. to set an unclear and an
unconvincing default rule for the coverage of American employment
statutes.7 In its second section, the essay also briefly describes how U.K.
courts not only have failed to provide a more convincing default rule,
but also have encumbered British law with unnecessary doctrine drawn
from the common law of contracts.8
The essay, in its third section, then explains how the common law
of respondeat superior offers a principled basis for deciding both when,
and to which employing entities, responsibility for the protections and

6

The essay does not advocate for any particular benefits or protections; it instead assumes the choice of benefits
and protections is a separable policy question that can be and has been rationally answered in variant ways in the
U.S. and the U.K.
7
See infra text accompanying notes 15‐36.
8
See infra text accompanying notes 37‐73.

benefits of modern laws should be assigned.9 The fourth section then
elaborates how the principled basis for employer responsibility derived
from respondeat superior law can be embraced by American courts,
and British policy makers,10 through adoption of the distinction
between employees and independent contractors articulated in the
recently adopted Restatement of Employment Law.11
The remainder of the essay then elaborates how the principle, as
expressed in the Restatement of Employment Law, would apply to
some difficult questions in the modern economy. The fifth section
considers how the principle meets the challenges posed by employers
shifting the risks of economic activity on to vulnerable workers whose
duties remain aligned with the interests of the employers and whose
need of protection and benefits remains as great as those of more
traditional workers.12 The sixth section addresses assigning
responsibility for certain workers’ statutory benefits and protections to
multiple employers whose interests are served by the workers.13
Finally, the seventh section considers several reasons that policy

9

See infra text accompanying notes 74‐100.
See infra text accompanying notes 101‐106.
11
See Restatement of Employment Law (2015). I served as a Reporter with the primary responsibility for the
drafting of the sections in this Restatement that define the employment relationship it covers. The positions
expressed in this essay of course are my own and not to be associated with the ALI or any of its members.
12
See infra text accompanying notes 107‐139.
13
See infra text accompanying notes 140‐203.
10

makers might wish to depart from the default rule derived from
respondeat superior.14

14

See infra text accompanying notes 204‐215.

I.

American Law

Most federal American employment or labor statutes define
coverage through a meaningless and typically circular definition of the
employment relationship. For instance, many limit protection to those
described as an “employee” and then define employee to be “any
individual employed by an employer.”15 As a result, the U.S. Supreme
Court for at least the past forty years has invoked the “common law” to
provide legitimacy for its opinions concerning the scope of federal
employment statutes that offer protection to employees but not to
independent contractors.16 Earlier it had tried to use a more flexible
approach, taking into account the purpose of the particular law, such as
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)17 governing collective
bargaining,18 but had been chastised by Congress for departing from
the common law as a default definition for covered employees.19

15

See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2017); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. § 630(f) (2017); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2017); Employment Retirement
Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2017); Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2) (2012);
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 652(6) (2017).
16
See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992); Cmty. for Creative Non‐Violence v. Reid,
490 U.S. 730 (1989).
17
29 U.S.C. §§ 151‐169.
18
See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 126‐128 (1944) (rejecting use of “common‐law tests”
“without regard to the statute’s purposes”).
19
See H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., on H.R. 3020, at 18 (1947). The Court subsequently followed the
Congressional directive to use the common law in interpreting the NLRA. See NLRB v. United Insurance Co., 390
U.S. 254 (1968).

The Supreme Court’s more recent invocation of the common law
may have provided some legitimacy, but it certainly has not provided
clarity. The reason for this lack of clarity in the U.S. is not simply the
many state court jurisdictions with the authority to make their own
common law, and a federal court system that since 1938 has been
denied the authority to make general American federal common law
not tied to the interpretation of statutes.20 It also is because the state
court systems have not been able to develop a clear consensus on a
definition of the employee relationship, even with the assistance of the
efforts of the American Law Institute (ALI) to restate the best common
law formulated in American jurisdictions.21
It was not as if the ALI did not try to provide a meaningful
definition, even before the recent Restatement of Employment Law.
Agency law for purposes of setting the master’s vicarious or respondeat
superior liability for the torts of servants required a definition of
20

See Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
The ALI was founded in 1923 to help clarify and simplify common law in America by the production of what are
called Restatements of that law. The membership of the ALI includes several thousand leading American lawyers,
judges, and academics, invited to join through a membership process. The Restatements must be accepted not
only by a final vote of the general membership, but also first by a self‐perpetuating inner Council of fewer than 100
members. The Restatements are to articulate in black letter with supporting illustrations and comments a wise
synthesis of the sometimes variant positions taken by courts in the fifty state systems and in some cases by the
federal system. One of the ALI’s Directors, Herbert Wechsler, explained that the Restatements should take a
position on an issue that would be taken by a wise judge in a jurisdiction that had not yet ruled on the issue. This
ruling presumably would be influenced by holdings and their rationales in other jurisdictions that had ruled, but it
would not necessarily embrace a majority position if the minority position was more persuasive. See Herbert
Wechsler, American Law Institute, Report of the Director 6 (1966) (“In judging what was “right”. A preponderating
balance of authority would normally be given weight, as it no doubt would generally weigh with courts, but it has
not been thought to be conclusive.”).
21

servant, and the Restatements of Agency have attempted to provide
one, primarily through a right to control test.22 The mid‐twentieth
century Second Restatement of Agency, which remains the most
influential, at least on this issue, defines servant as “a person employed
to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to
the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the
other’s control or right to control.”23 The Second Restatement of
Agency recognized, however, that the decisions could not be fully
captured by so simple a formulation. A “full‐time cook”, “ship captains,
“managers of great corporations,” a “traveling salesman,” and “skilled
artisans … with whose method of accomplishing results the so‐called
master has neither the knowledge nor the desire to interfere,” all could
be servants regardless of the attenuation of the master’s control or
even right to control physical conduct .24
The Second Restatement of Agency thus supplemented the “right‐
to‐control” test with a non‐exclusive list of ten factors to determine
“whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent
contractor.”25 It did not, however, specify whether these factors were
22

Restatement Third, Agency § 7.07(3) (2005); Restatement Second, Agency § 220 (1958); Restatement First,
Agency § 220.
23
Restatement Second, Agency § 220(1). This language was almost identical to that of the Restatement First,
Agency § 220(1).
24
Restatement Second, Agency § 220, Comments a, e, i.
25
Id. at § 220(2). This subsection states that in “determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an
independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among other, are considered: (a) the extent of control

to be used to expand the scope of employee status beyond that
indicated by the right‐to‐control test or rather were to be used in
service to this test. The former, however, seems suggested by inclusion,
as the first of the ten listed factors, of “(a) the extent of control which,
by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the
work.”26 The Restatement Second of Agency thereby presented judges
with great discretion and lawyers with great uncertainty.27
The Supreme Court has not provided more clarity with its
formulation of a default definitional line between employees who are
protected by federal statutes and independent contractors who are
not. That formulation, which the Supreme Court purports to be based
on the common law,28 includes consideration of “the hiring party’s right
to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished,” but also lists “[a]mong the other factors relevant to
[the] inquiry” twelve other factors, including six that were at least
which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work; (b) whether or not the one
employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in
the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d)
the skill required in the particular occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (f) the length of time for which the
person is employed; (g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the work is
a part of the regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation
of master and servant; and (j) whether the principal is or is not in business.” The Restatement First, Agency §
220(c) contained the same list, without the last factor.
26
See supra note 25.
27
The Restatement Third, Agency provided no further clarification. It adopted the “right‐to‐control” test in its §
7.07, but acknowledged that ‘[i]n some employment relationships, an employer’s right of control may be
attenuated. For example, senior corporate officers, like captain of ships, may exercise discretion in performing
their work.” §7.07, comment f.
28
See supra note and text accompanying note 16.

similar to those in the Restatement Second list.29 The Court has not
explained why it provided additional factors or declined to include
others in the Restatement list. It has offered no guidance on the
relative weight that is to be given to the factors, and has even declined
to confirm a primary role for the “right‐to‐control” factor. It has stated
only, and unhelpfully, that “[n]o one of these factors is
determinative.”30
Furthermore, in a case interpreting the circular definition of
employee in the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
the Court cited not only the Restatement Second, but also an Internal
Revenue Service ruling that sets forth “20 factors as guides in
determining whether an individual qualifies as a common‐law
“employee” in various tax law contexts.”31 The Court, however, did not
explain its choice of listed factors or their relevance to any essential
difference between employees and independent contractors that
relates to the general purpose of federal statutes that use employment
status to define the scope of their protections or benefit conferral. The
29

The six similar factors are (1) the skill required; (2) the source of the instrumentalities and tools; (3) the duration
of the relationship between the parties; (4) the method of payment; (5) whether the work is part of the regular
business of the hiring party; and (6) whether the hiring party is in business. The additional factors are (1) the
location of the work; (2) whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; (3)
the extent of the hiring party’s discretion over when and how long to work; (4) the hired party’s role in hiring and
paying assistants; (5) the provision of employee benefit; and (6) the tax treatment of the hired party. See Cmty. for
Creative Non‐Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751‐52 (1989).
30
Id. at 752.
31
See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323‐24 (1992) (citing Rev. Rul. 87‐41, 1987‐1 Cum. Bull.
296, 298‐299).

Court, like the Restatement Second of Agency, thus offered only an
unstructured multifactor test that confers great discretion on trial
judges and presents great uncertainty for lawyers.
One important federal American employment statute, the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA),32 does supplement its circular definition of
employee with an arguably more meaningful definition of “employ.”
For purposes of the FLSA, to “employ includes to suffer or permit to
work.”33 Soon after passage of the FLSA, the Court described this
definition as the “broadest” in any statute,34 and the lower courts since
have purported to interpret the scope of the FLSA protections more
broadly than those of other statutes with only the circular definition of
employee. They have done so, however, through consideration of
multiple factors that mirror many of those included in both the § 220(2)
list and the Court’s general common law list.35 The claim of the lower
courts that their interpretation of the FLSA definition of “employ”
focuses on “economic realities” clarifies nothing and carries the absurd
implication that the common law definitions of employee are based on

32

29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
34
United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S 360, 363 n.3 (1937) (quoting 81 Cong. Rec. 7657 (statement of Sen.
Black)).
35
The factors used in FLSA cases vary between the Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835
F.2d 1529, 1535 (1987) (factors include employer’s control over work, the degree of employee’s investment in
equipment and materials, whether the work requires special skill, and the degree of permanency or duration of
the work).
33

economic fantasy.36 In fact, the FLSA multifactor test, whether or not
applied to sweep more broadly than are the common law multifactor
tests, is not more structured, focused, or clear.
Multifactor tests can be helpful when a legal question turns on
highly variant factual contexts. They cannot alone provide adequate
rules of decision, however, without a structure provided by an ultimate
question the various factors are to answer. Without such a structure,
such tests offer only minimally confined judicial discretion. Factors can
be tallied without regard to relative weight, or alternatively ranked in
importance and subordinated, without the judge revealing what
considerations are actually driving a decision.
American multifactor tests not only have not offered a structure
or ultimate standard, they also have not paid attention to particular
attention to the relative needs of the workers who could be covered by
employment statutes or the ease with which they can be manipulated
by employers wishing to escape the costs of incurring responsibility.
Any compelling boundary for employment statutes must distinguish
among sets of workers with significantly different needs of having other
entities provide the minimum protections and benefits offered by the

36

See id. at 1540 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“This implies that the definition of “independent contractor” used in
tort cases is inconsistent with “economic reality” but that the seven factors applied in FLSA cases capture that
“reality.” In which way did “economic reality” elude the American Law Institute and the courts of 50 states?”).

statutes. Although any distinction only offers a default standard that
can be modified to serve the purposes of any particular statute, the
definition must at least provide an economically relevant base line,
particularly because the pull of the common law’s legitimacy resists
modification. Furthermore, given the incentives for employers to cut
labor costs by avoiding liability and responsibility for protections and
benefits promised by employment statutes, the definition has to be one
that cannot be easily manipulated by employers through the
structuring of their labor market and their formal contractual
commitments.
II.

British Law

The United Kingdom’s matrix of worker protection and benefit
statutes,37 like those of the U.S., limit their beneficiaries to workers in
particular economic relationships. The economic relationship required
by some of the statutes seems more encompassing than that required
by others,38 but all the statutes share three characteristics, two of
which are also shared with American statutes and one of which is not.

37

The most important current statutes include: Equality Act 2010 (prohibiting employment discrimination);
Employment Rights Act 1996 (prohibiting unfair dismissal; requiring compensation for redundancy; requiring
written statement of employment terms; requiring notice of dismissal); Trade Union and Labour Relations
(Consolidation Act) 1992 (providing labour union protections and benefits); National Minimum Wage Act 1998;
Employment Relations Act 1999 (leave for dependent care); Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. See also Working
Time Regulations 1998 (working time limitations; paid annual leave).
38
The Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA) § 230(3) defines a “worker” as “an individual who has entered into or
works under (a) a contract of employment, or (b) any other contract, whether express or implied and (if it is

The two shared characteristics are (1) that the required economic
relationships do not include those with independent businesses or
contractors and (2) that the line between protected and unprotected
relationships is not adequately drawn by statutory language and thus
requires judicial elaboration. The unshared characteristic is British law’s
conditioning of protection on the relationship being contractual,39 while
American law requires only a status of employment.40
The two shared characteristics have resulted in British courts
struggling like American courts to distinguish protected workers from
independent contractors without resort to unfocused multifactor tests.
express) whether oral or in writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or
services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer
of any profession or business carried on by the individual.” See also Trade Union and Labour Relations
(Consolidation) Act 1992, § 296. Some important rights, however, including, those to complain of unfair dismissal
and to claim compensation for redundancy, are granted only to those covered by limb (a) of this definition, those
with a “contract of employment.” See Employment Rights Act 1996 §§ 94(1), 135. See also infra text accompanying
notes and notes 63‐69.
39
See the definitions quoted supra in note 38. Simon Deakin, in numerous writings, has traced the origins of the
use of contract as a basis for U.K. employment protections to contingent choices made in twentieth century
welfare legislation rather than to the dictates of common law jurisprudence. Deakin’s work demonstrates that
post‐War British legislators wanted lower status manual workers, who had been treated as servants to a master in
a contract of service, to be categorized with higher status workers in contracts of employment. See, e.g., Simon
Deakin, Does the Personal Employment Contract Provide a Basis for the Reunification of Employment Law?, 36
Indus. L. J. 68, 74‐75 (2007); Simon Deakin, The Many Futures of the Contract of Employment, in Labor Law in an
Era of Globalization 184‐88 (J. Conaghan et al. eds. 2001). See also Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson, The Law of
the Labour Market: Industrialization, Employment and Legal Evolution, supra note 1, ch. 2. Long term, relational
work contracts of course were most common in the U.K. as in the U.S. during the mid‐century, post‐War decades.
The elevation of contracts of service to contracts of employment, however, set up an unfortunate dichotomy with
other forms of more casual work relationships that proliferated later in the century. See Mark Freedland, The
Personal Employment Contract 16‐17 (2003).
40
Some British commentators have argued that U.K. law should not base employment rights on the existence of a
“contract of service.” See Bob Hepple, Restructuring Employment Rights, 15 Indus. L. J. 69, 74 (1986) (“the contract
of service should be replaced by a broad definition of an ‘employment relationship’ between the worker and the
undertaking to work in return for pay.”). Others contend that British law is committed to contractual analysis, but
that such analysis is sufficiently capacious to encompass any appropriately protected economic relationship. See
Freedland, supra note 39, at 6.

U.K courts, like U.S. courts, and the ALI Restatements of Agency, have
understood that a simple control test cannot make distinctions that
accord with past precedents, including those that define respondeat
superior liability.41 British courts thus also have stressed additional
factors, including whether the worker bears the risk of profit or loss,42
and the degree to which a worker is integrated into the putative
employer’s organization, especially in cases where the worker is highly
skilled.43 Like American courts, however, the British courts have not
settled on a particular set of factors or an ultimate organizing standard
to distinguish independent contractors.44
Significantly, the unshared characteristic, the British statutes’
requirement that protected workers have a contractual relationship
with a legally responsible entity, has resulted in other layers of
confusion and unnecessary rigidity in U.K. law. The more important
doctrinal rigidity has been the conditioning of a contract of
employment on a mutuality of obligations between workers and a
41

See, e.g., White v. Troutbeck SA [2013] EWCA Civ 1171; [2013] I.R.L.R. 949; [2014] I.C.R. D5 CA (Civ. Div.). See
also Hepple, supra note 40.
42
See, e.g., Market Investigations v. Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 Q.B. 173.
43
See, e.g., Stevenson Jordan & Harrison v. MacDonald & Evans [1952] 1 T.L.R. 101; 69 R.P.C. 10 CA (“… under a
contract of service, a man is employed as part of the business and his work is done as an integral part of the
business; whereas under a contract for services, his work, although done for the business, is not integrated into it
but is only accessory to it.”) (Lord Denning).
44
Compare, e.g., Market Investigations v Minister of Social Security, supra note 42 (applying multifactor test to
determine whether worker is performing services “in business on his own account”), with, e.g., Ready Mixed
Concrete (Southeast) Ltd v. Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2 Q.B. 497 (applying unfocused
multifactor test to find driver‐owners of lorries to be independent contractors). See also, e.g., Wickens v.
Champion Employment [1984] I.C.R. 365 (EAT), at 369‐70 (applying a ‘common sense’ balancing test).

putative employer.45 This doctrine, which does not derive directly from
contract law,46 has provided special difficulties for casual workers who
are not given commitments of future work and who are not asked to
commit to accepting any work that is offered. The British courts have
held that such casual workers do not have a general or “umbrella”
contract on which their continuing status as employees can be based.47
This doctrine developed even though there is no compelling
reason why a worker who renders service outside the coverage of a
general “umbrella” or “global” contract in consideration for an
employer’s promise of remuneration should be treated differently
under employee protection or benefit statutes than a worker who
renders service that he or she earlier pledged to perform and the
employer pledged to request.48 Whether or not workers under or
outside such an umbrella contract labor for sufficient hours over a

45

See, e.g., Nethermere (St. Neots) Ltd v. Gardiner [1984] I.C.R. 612) (“There must … be an irreducible minimum of
obligations on each side to create a contract of service.”) (Stephenson, L.J.); O’Kelly v. Trusthouse Forte Plc [1984]
Q.B. 90 (upholding tribunal finding that casual workers did not have a contract of employment without having an
obligation to take work).
46
Contract law requires consideration and thus commitment, but it does not require that the consideration and
commitment be of the same sort. See Hugh Collins, Employment Rights of Casual Workers, 29 Indus. L. J. 73 (2000).
See also Douglas Brodie, Employees, Workers and the Self‐Employed, 34 Indus. L. J. 253, 255 (2005).
47
See, e.g., Carmichael v National Power Plc [1999] 1 W.L.R. 2042; [1999] 4 All E.R. 897 HL. See the discussion in
Collins, supra note 46.
48
The mutuality of obligations doctrine and the notion of some overarching umbrella agreement seems
particularly unsuitable for employment contracts without definite terms. See Julia Tomassetti, The
Contracting/Producing Ambiguity and the Collapse of the Means/Ends Distinction in Employment, 66 S.C. L. Rev.
315, 349‐353 (2014) (criticizing the use of contract law to explain a continuing employment relationship, given the
inequality of bargaining power and the general incompleteness of terms). “The only way to construe employment
as a “contract” is to think of it as a contract that is continuously renewed at each moment the relationship endures
and in which both employee and employer provide consideration through performance.” Id. at 354.

sufficient number of continuous weeks to be covered by a statute, they
should have the same protection if their working hours were the same.
The need of a worker for protections and benefits is surely not less if
the worker has no commitment of future work from an employer.
British courts, after a period of uncertainty, thus have been
compelled to address the problem posed by the mutuality of
obligations condition by recognizing that workers without a general
umbrella contract with a particular employer may still qualify as
employees based on a series of more specific employment contracts
covering each separate period of work.49 The decisions now recognize
that there is an obligation to perform and compensate service during
each specific period. To achieve protection under statutes requiring
continuity of employment,50 however, casual workers still must be able
to establish that any break in service between the specific contracts
qualifies as a “temporary cessation of work” under the relevant

49

See, e.g., Cornwall CC v. Prater; sub nom. Prater v. Cornwall CC [2006] 2 All E.R. 1013; [2006] I.C.R. 731; [2006]
I.R.L.R. 362 (CA). See also A.C.L. Davies, Casual Workers and Continuity of Employment, 35 Indus. L. J. 196 (2006).
50
See Employment Rights Act 1996 §§ 210‐13. Examples of regulations requiring continuity of work include
Maternity and Parental Leave Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/312), reg. 13(1); Flexible Working Regulations 2002 (SI
2002/3236) reg. 3(1)(a).

employment law.51 Courts have been hesitant to do so where the break
in work is long or where other workers have been substituted.52
The other doctrinal impediment to employment status derived by
British courts because of the statutes’ requirement of contractual
status is that the employee’s obligation be for personal service. Even an
employee who has committed to ensuring that future committed work
will be performed may not have the actual performance of this work
covered by British employment statutes if he or she did not commit to
doing the work personally.53
A commitment of personal service may be relevant to the
demonstration that the service will be rendered as an employee rather
than as an independent business; individuals running independent
businesses in their own interest generally will have the discretion to
satisfy contractual commitments through the allocation of workers as
well as capital.54 Moreover, the British courts have mitigated the impact
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See Employment Rights Act 1996 § 212(3). This is made easier by the law no longer requiring a minimum
number hours of work in a week in which there is an employment contract for purposes of determining continuity.
See id. at § 212(1). See SI 1195/31.
52
See A.C.L. Davies, The Contract for Intermittent Employment, 36 Ind. L. J. 102, 115 (2007) and cases cited
therein.
53
See, e.g., Express & Echo Publications Ltd v. Tanton [1999] I.C.R. 693; [1999] I.R.L.R. 367 CA (Civ. Div.) (clause
requiring driver to find a substitute at his own expense if he was sick or otherwise unable to work meant no
requirement of personal service). This requirement does not apply to homeworkers, those who contract to do
work in a place not under the employer’s control. See Employment Rights Act 1996 § 43K (1)(b); National Minimum
Wage Act 1998 § 35(2).
54
Thus, the decision in Mirror Newspaper Group Ltd v Gunning, [1986] 1W.L.R. 546; [1986] 1 All E.R. 385 CA (Civ.
Div.), seems to have correctly rejected employment status for a daughter who took over ownership of her
deceased father’s newspaper delivery business.

of the personal service requirement by recognizing that contractual
provisions that allow or require substitute workers may not reflect the
reality of the economic relationship and contract, and thus can be set
aside as shams.55
However, in cases where there is not a true independent business
being operated, a worker’s actual discretion to share hours with or
substitute another laborer to do the same work and collect the same
pay does not mean that the actually performed work of the
contractually bound worker or the substituted worker is in less need of
protections or benefits than is work performed by a contractually
obligated worker. Drawing a distinction based solely on a personal
service commitment, like drawing a distinction based on the existence
of an overarching mutuality of obligations, constitutes doctrinal
formalism with no nexus to the purpose of employee protection or
benefit statutes. Both distinctions only serve to provide employers with
possible loopholes to obtain cheaper labor by escaping the force of
employment statutes.
Although British courts by formulating contract doctrine may have
made even worse use of the common law than American courts when
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See Autoclenz Ltd v. Belcher [2011] UKSC 41; [2011] 4 All E.R. 745; [2011] I.C.R. 1157 S.C.. The recognition of
sham written contracts also may be applicable to clauses that do not provide for mutual obligations. See A. L. Bogg,
Sham Self‐Employment in the Supreme Court, 41 Ind. L. J. 328 (2012).

setting the bounds of employment statutes, Parliament, unlike
Congress, has at least made some purposeful attempts to break these
judicial bounds. Consider in particular the broader definition of worker
applicable to protections provided by the new Labour Government,
such as the National Minimum Wage Act 1998,56 the Working Time
Regulations 1998,57 and the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998.58 These
provisions cover not only workers with (a) contract of employment, but
also those subject to:
… (b) any other contract … whereby the individual undertakes to
do or perform personally any work or services for another party
to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that
of a client or customer of any profession or business carried on by
the individual.59
Further, the Equality Act 2010, consolidated U.K. prohibitions of
discrimination based on race, sex, age, disability, gender reassignment,
marriage, pregnancy and childbirth, religion or belief, and sexual
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See National Minimum Wage Act 1998.
See Working Time Regulations 1998 (SI 1998/1833). These regulations implemented the original European
Council Directive 93/104/EC concerning certain aspects of the organization of working time. (O.J. No. L307,
13.12.93, p. 18), since superseded by Working Time Directive 2003/88/EC.
58
This protection of whistleblowing is now embodied in the Employment Rights Act 1996 §§ 43A‐L.
59
See Employment Rights Act 1996 § 230(3); National Minimum Wage Act § 54; Working Time Regulations reg. 2.
See also Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 § 296(1).
57

orientation for those who are employed under or apply to be employed
under “a contract personally to do work.”60
This legislation represents commendable attempts to break free
of the controlled and subordinated servant model of employment.61
The attempts fall short for several obvious reasons, however. First, the
distinctions made by the definitions, especially in the second prong of
the worker definition, are far from clear.62 What, for instance, is
intended by the critical word “business” in this prong? Ambiguity again
may require judicial resort to unfocused common law tests.
Second, the lack of clarity is compounded by the absence of
rationales for not expanding coverage in all employment protection and
benefit statutes. Providing especially broad coverage for any
prohibition of discrimination is easy to justify, but less obvious are
rationales for not providing equally broad coverage for such topics as
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Equality Act 2010 § 83. But cf. Jivraj v Hashwani [2011] U.K.S.C. 40; [2011] 1 W.L.R. 1872; [2012] 1 All E.R. 629
S.C. (explaining that the definition covers only contracts of subordination). Recent cases indicate that the coverage
of the Equality Act is commensurate with that of limb (b) in the definition of worker in the 1998 provisions, despite
the absence of the business or profession qualification in the Equality Act definition. See Pimlico Plumbers Ltd. &
Anor v. Smith [2017] E.W.C.A. Civ 51 at ¶¶, 48, 92; Bates van Winkelhof v. Clyde & Coo LLP [2014] U.K.S.C. 32 at ¶
67.
61
Furthemore, British tribunals recognized this purpose for the expanded definition of worker in the 1998
regulations. See, e.g., Byrne Brothers (Formwork) Ltd v. Baird & Others [2002] I.R.L.R. 96 (EAT) at ¶ 17(4) (“The
reason why employees are thought to need such protection is that they are in a subordinate and dependent
position vis‐a‐vis their employers; the purpose of the Regulations is to extend protection to workers who are,
substantively and economically, in the same position.”)
62
This criticism is made forcefully by Professor Freedland. See Mark Freedland, supra note 39, at 25‐26.

unfair dismissal,63 redundancy pay,64 dismissal notice,65 and family‐
friendly leave,66 as for topics covered by the “’worker” definition, such
as minimum wages67 and vacation pay.68 Parliament seemed to
recognize the inconsistency in 1999 by giving the Secretary of State
power to extend all employment protection rights generally to
“workers”;69 but this power has never been invoked to issue regulations
enabling workers to make claims for unfair dismissal or redundancy
payments.
The most important deficiency in the expanded definitions of
coverage in some U.K. statutes is their continued insistence that
protection depend on there being a contractual relationship between a
protected worker and a responsible entity. The more significant aspect
of this deficiency may not be the allowance of continued judicial
application of the personal service and mutuality of obligations
doctrines in decisions applying the expanded definitions of coverage.
While there have been such decisions,70 it seems likely that the courts
more recent recognition that workers may have a series of separate
63

See Employment Rights Act 1996 Pt X.
See id. Pt XI.
65
See id. § 1(4)(e) (written statement required); § 86 (minimum periods).
66
See, e.g., id. §71 (maternity leave)..
67
See National Minimum Wage Act 1998 c. 39 § 1.
68
See Working Time Regulations reg. 13 (annual leave).
69
See Employment Relations Act 1999 § 23.
70
See, e.g., Mingeley v. Pennock [2004] EWCA Civ 328; [2004] I.C.R. 727; [2004] I.R.L.R. 373 (race discrimination
case); Byrne Brothers Ltd v. Baird & Others, supra note 61 (working time regulations). See the commentary in
A.C.L. Davies, supra note 52, at 104‐05.
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contracts of service, even without an “umbrella” contract imposing
continuing commitments to provide and accept work,71 will be most
important in decisions under the expanded definition.72 As will be
explained below, however, the requirement, even in the expanded
definitions, that a worker’s economic relationship with a responsible
employer be contractual poses special difficulties for cases where a
worker has cause to claim the responsibility of multiple or joint
employers, but has a true contractual relationship only with one.73
III.

The Principle of Respondeat Superior
Ultimately, however, the cumbersome use of the common law to

define the scope of employment statutes in the UK, like the muddled
use of it in the US, need not pose an insurmountable obstacle to the
formulation of a default definitional standard that can be both clear
and consistent with the usual purposes of such statutes. Indeed, if used
not to delineate formalistic barriers based on inapplicable contractual
or master‐servant models, but rather to understand how modern
societies might sensibly assign responsibility for the benefits and
protections they wish to attach to work, the common law can
contribute to a solution rather than aggravate the problem of defining
71

See supra text accompanying note 49.
See, e.g., Pimlico Plumbers Ltd. & Anor v. Smith [2017] EWCA Civ 51; Aslam v Uber BV [2017] I.R.L.R. 4; [2016]
EW Misc B68 (ET); see also James v. Redcats (Brands) Ltd [2007] I.C.R. 1006; [2007] I.R.L.R. 296 EAT.
73
See infra text accompanying notes 140, 155‐163.
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coverage. Anglo‐American common law can be used as a source of
insight to define a compelling and clear default rule for coverage,
consistent with what was proposed in the Restatement of Employment
Law, and reachable through a liberal construction of British statutes as
well.
The common law that should be used as a source of insight is not
that of contracts, but rather that of torts and agency. It is the law of
respondeat superior, the law of vicarious liability of “masters” for the
torts of their “servants.” This use of the law of vicarious liability may
seem not only superficially obvious, but also fundamentally misguided.
It may seem superficially obvious because it was precisely for purposes
of respondeat superior vicarious liability that the nineteenth century
common law of both the US and the UK both first used the right to
control details of work as the central factor to distinguish servants from
independent contractors.74
The use of vicarious liability as a source of insight for defining the
scope of employment protection and benefit statutes, on the other
hand, may seem fundamentally misguided because the master‐servant
74

Modern legal historians, however, have highlighted that a right to control test was not originally formulated as
central to respondeat superior analysis. See Marc Linder, The Employment Relationship in Anglo‐American Law, A
Historical Perspective (1989); Deakin and Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 142‐46. Linder concludes that the test
emerged in the U.S. only late in the nineteenth century with the encouragement of treatise drafters to restrict the
scope of vicarious liability in the interest of developing capitalism. Deakin and Wilkinson, at 91, conclude that
“[t]he control test was only clearly asserted later [in the U.K.] in cases concerning, not the common law of vicarious
liability, but the scope of social legislation.”

relationship and its central element of total subordination and control
are not descriptive of labor relationships in modern economies.75 Not
surprisingly, some employment law commentators who accept that a
master’s control over a servant may be part of the justification for
imposing liability on the master for the servant’s torts, reject the
control test as a basis for a sufficiently expansive scope for employment
statutes.76
When considered from a somewhat different perspective,
however, the law of respondeat superior and its distinction of
independent contractors offer a very different and superior model for
defining work that warrants the protection of modern employment
statutes from that of a servant fully controlled by a master. That model
is one of employer cost internalization where there is an alignment of
employee duties and employer interests. It is the alignment of their
duties with the interests of their employers, not their employers’
control over their work, that best distinguishes employees from
independent contractors for purposes of respondeat superior liability.
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See Deakin and Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 90; Otto Kahn‐Freund, Servants and Independent Contractors, 14
Mod. L. Rev. 504, 505‐506 (1951).
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See, e.g., Linder, supra note 74, at 43‐46; Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting
Back to Basics, 10 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 479, 482 (2016); Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an
Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 Berkeley. J. of Emp. & Lab. L. 295, 311‐314
(2001). Furthermore, modern writers have advocated expanding the service or work relationships that support
vicarious liability. See, e.g., Paula Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort, a Comparative Perspective 140‐43 (2010); Ewan
McKendrick, Vicarious Liability and Independent Contractors – a Re‐Examination, 53 Mod. L. Rev. 770 (1990).

Employer control over a worker is neither sufficient nor necessary for
respondeat superior liability, while an alignment of an employee’s
duties with the interests of the employer is both necessary and
sufficient.
That master‐employer control, or even right to control, is not
sufficient for respondeat superior liability is clear from the ‘scope of
employment’ condition on such liability.77 Under the law of respondeat
superior, an employer is liable for torts committed by its employees,
even when those torts are committed through acts contrary to the
employer’s instructions,78 as long as the employees are intending to act
in accord with their duty to serve the interests of their employer within
the scope of their employment.79 Whenever the employees, however,
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See § 7.07 of Restatement Third, Agency: Employee Acting Within Scope of Employment
(1) An employer is subject to vicarious liability for a tort committed
by its employee acting within the scope of employment.
(2) An employee acts within the scope of employment when
performing work assigned by the employer or engaging in a
course of conduct subject to the employer’s control. An
employee’s act is not within the scope of employment when it
occurs within an independent course of conduct not intended by
the employee to serve any purpose of the employer.
See also Restatement Second, Agency § 228; Restatement of Employment § 4.02.
78
See, e.g., Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co. 158 E.R. 993; [1862] 1 Hurl. & C. 526 Ct of Exch (bus driver’s
violation of employer’s instructions not to obstruct passage by another bus); Bayley v. Manchester, Sheffield &
Lincolnshire Ry Co. [1873] L.R. & C.P. 148 (liability for mistaken use of authority in course of employment);
McLachlan v. Bell, 261 F.3d 908, 911 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying California law, even willful and malicious torts
contrary to employer’s instructions can be the basis of vicarious liability if in course of performance of employee’s
job.) See also P. S. Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts 198‐99 (1967).
79
See, e.g., Ellis v Turner [1800] 8 T.R. 531, 533, 101 E.R. 1529, 1531 (“The defendants are responsible for the acts
of their servant in those things that respect his duty under them, though they are not answerable for his
misconduct in those things that do not respect his duty to them.”); Laugher v Pointer (1826) 5 B & C 547, 108 E.R.
204.

depart from their employer‐aligned duties in pursuit of their own
independent interests, “on a frolic of their own” as described in the
memorable phrase,80 liability for any torts they commit is not imputed
to their employer.81 This qualification is not explained by the level of
control over its employees the employer exercises, or has the right to
exercise, because that level of control does not change when the
employees take a detour from their duties to pursue their own
interests. Rather what changes is the alignment of the employees’
purposeful actions with their duties to serve the interests of their
employer.82
The misalignment of an independent contractor’s duties with the
interests of even an economically dominant contractor, rather than
some variation on a control test, also explains why the dominant
contractor is not responsible for an economically subordinate but
independent contractor’s torts. An economically dominant contractor
could increase its control over an economically subordinate contractor,
and presumably would do so with a sufficient incentive of potential
80

See, e.g., Joel v Morison [1834] 6 Car. & P. 501, 503, 172 E.R. 1338, 1339 (Parke, B.) (“The master is only liable
where the servant was acting in the course of his employment. If he was going out of his way, against his master’s
implied commands, when driving on his master’s business, he will make his master liable; but if he was going on a
frolic of his own, without being at all on his master’s business, the master will not be liable.”)
81
See, e.g., Storey v. Ashton [1869] 4 Q.B. 476 (No vicarious liability because “they turned off in a different
direction and proceeded to the clerk’s house for purposes of their own.”)
82
An alignment principle was expressed in British law as early as 1800: “The defendants are responsible for the
acts of their servant in those things that respect his duty under them, though they are not answerable for his
misconduct in those things that do not respect his duty to them.” Ellis v. Turner, 8 T.R. 531, 533, 101 E.R. 1529,
1531.

liability. But potential control is not sufficient for vicarious liability when
the subordinate contractor retains discretion over sufficient resources
to pursue, at least to some extent, its own independent interests in its
performance of work for the dominant contractor.83
Thus, control or the potential for control is not a sufficient
condition for the imposition of respondeat superior liability; the
tortfeasor also must be exercising duties in alignment with the interests
of the principal.84 Furthermore, control or the potential for control also
is not a necessary condition of respondeat superior liability. Courts
impose such liability when employees are performing their duties in
alignment with the interests of their employer, regardless of whether
the employer is actually in a position to control this performance.85 This
explains, better than any unpredictable multifactor test, why corporate
chief executives, airplane pilots, ship captains, orchestra maestros,
gourmet cooks, traveling salespersons and long distance truck drivers
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See, e.g., Earle v. Hall, 43 Mass. 353, 361 (1841) (Owner of land not liable for acts of builders’ employees where
builder “could in no sense be considered as building this house on account of Hall; but on his own account. He was
building it on land of which Hall at the time held the fee, as security for the purchase money of the land; but he
had a covenant for a conveyance, which might be specifically enforced; and when performed, the building would
enure wholly to his benefit.”)
84
Control of course has not been a sufficient condition for imposing vicarious liability on other superordinate
parties, including supervisors of employees, as well as parents and teachers of children.
85
See, e.g., Yates v. Brown, 25 Mass. 23, 24 (S.J.C. 1829) (owner of vessel is liable for injury to other vessel
“notwithstanding there may be a pilot on board, who has the entire control and management of the vessel.”).
Alignment of interests also explains better than control why the common law makes a partnership and each
partner vicariously liable for the torts of co‐partners within the scope of the partner’s service to the partnership,
regardless of whether the co‐partners are subject to the control of other partners. See, e.g., Wallan v. Rankin, 173
F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1948) (applying Oregon law); Ashworth v. Stanwix [1860] 3 E. & E. 701.

all can impose liability on their employers through torts committed
while loyally performing their discretionary duties in the scope of their
employment, even though outside any practical ability of their
employer to control.86
The principle that justifies an alignment with employer‐interests‐
standard for respondeat superior liability might be termed reciprocal
cost internalization: An entity that causes and benefits from the service
of workers should have to pay the reciprocal external social costs
resulting from that work, at least whenever the workers cannot
themselves pay.87 This principle, of having to ensure payment for
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See supra text accompanying note 24. From the seminal case of Bush v. Steinman, [1799] 126 E. R. 978, finding a
home owner liable for the torts of contractors he could not control, the British courts have rested respondeat
superior liability as much on the principal benefitting from service as on the principal’s control of service. The Bush
decision emphasis on the principal’s benefitting was qualified to account for the unaligned discretion of an
“independent business” contractor, see, e.g., Allen v. Hayward, [1845] 7 Q.B. 960, 975, 115 E. R. 749. But the
British courts’ continued to focus on whether the defendant principal benefitted from the work of the tortious
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independent business. See, e.g., Reedie v. The London and North Western Railway Co., [1849] 4 Ex. 244, 154 Eng.
Rep. 1201. A particularly direct judicial statement concerned a comedian found to be employed by theatrical
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not possess. The employer of such a servant can direct the objective to which the servant’s skill is to be addressed
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also the discussion in Linder, supra note 74, at 136‐143.
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Cf. Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1285
(2001) (explaining that respondeat superior liability, like workers’ compensation law and enterprise liability, is
based on notions of the fairness of enterprises paying for costs of injuries their activities cause); cf. also Gregory C.
Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1266 (1997) (developing the
fairness argument through Kantian analysis).

dangers created in service to your interests, has great social appeal88
and explains the boundaries of respondeat superior liability.
The principle differs from and explains better these boundaries
than does one based solely on providing incentive for an economically
efficient level of accident prevention.89 Imposing liability for an agent’s
torts on a principal with the ability to control the agent of course
provides incentives for the principal to prevent the torts.90 Further,
where the transaction costs of control are low, some economic analysis
indicates that requiring a dominant business with economic control
over an insolvent supplier or distributor to pay the costs of the
negligence of the supplier’s or distributor’s insolvent employees’
negligence can achieve an efficient level of prevention.91 The law of
respondeat superior, as it developed in the nineteenth century in both
the U.K. and the U.S., however, does not impose vicarious liability on
entities that benefit indirectly from the work of the tortfeasing
88

See, for instance, Judge Friendly’s much praised opinion in Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d
167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968) (citing the “deeply rooted sentiment that a business enterprise cannot justify disclaiming
responsibility for accidents which fairly may be said to be characteristic of its activities”).
89
See, e.g., Gilliker, supra note 76, at 241‐243. For economic analysis, see, e.g., George L. Priest, The Invention of
Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundation of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 461
(1985) (forcing enterprises to internalize costs of accidents attributable to their operations provides incentives for
cost‐justified prevention).
90
An employer’s formal legal right to control employees it cannot in practice control because of the employees’
special expertise or distance, however, seems to not provide any rational justification for the respondeat superior
doctrine based on incentives for prevention.
91
See Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 Yale L. J. 1231, 1232, 1264‐1268 (1984) (explaining
why franchisor vicarious liability would enhance social welfare). See also Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of
Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 Harv.
L. Rev. 563 (1988).

employees of other independent employers who control the employees
in their own independent interests.92
Similarly, this principle of reciprocal internalization differs from
and explains better the boundaries of respondeat superior liability than
does the other most frequent principle of policy used to explain this
form of vicarious liability, the principle of distributive justice.93 If a
wider distribution of risk could justify vicarious liability, any large
business would be required to act as an insurer against the torts of
employees of the most tenuously connected smaller employers, at least
when the employees’ torts were committed in the course of work that
was somehow related to their employer’s connection with the large
employer. Needless to say, this is inconsistent with the law of
respondeat superior not imposing liability on dominant, larger
enterprises for the torts of the employees of independent business
contractors.94
Once the alignment of employee duties with employer interests
based on reciprocal cost internalization is recognized as central to the
common law of respondeat superior, the relevance of this law to
92

See, e.g., Smith v. Cities Service Oil Co., 346 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1965); Pack v. Mayor of City of N.Y., 8 N.Y. 222
(C.A. 1853); Reedie v. The London & North Western Railway Co., [1849] 4 Ex. 244, 154 E. R. 1201.
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See Atiyah, supra note 78, at 22‐28. Or to put it more cynically, “we have to admit that vicarious liability owes its
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the Master’s Indemnity, 20 Mod. L. Rev. 220, 232 (1957).
94
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 92.

defining the bounds of modern employment statutes can be clarified.
These statutes define the minimum protections and benefits that a
modern polity has determined should be associated with a given level
of work. Because these protections and benefits do not exist in the
absence of a statutory command, no entity can be charged with directly
injuring workers by an act of omission without an assignment of
responsibility for their provision. Employment statutes assign this
responsibility by imposing affirmative duties on employers. This
assigning of affirmative duties to incur the costs of the provision of
statutory benefits and protections is like assigning responsibility for the
costs of the torts of insolvent tortfeasors; a business or other entity
should have responsibility to pay these costs only when it may reap the
benefit of work aligned with its interests. Where there is such
alignment, there should be responsibility based on a principle of
reciprocity: an enterprise with the opportunity to benefit fully from
work should be responsible for all of its potential social costs. Where
there is not the full opportunity for benefit because the work’s vector is
not fully aligned with the employer’s interests, a worker denied
statutory benefits and protections is like a third party victim of the tort
of an insolvent independent contractor. Both the worker and the
victim must provide for themselves or seek support from society more
generally.

This alignment‐reciprocal cost internalization analysis, though
limiting, sets a very broad scope of work for which employers
responsible for protections and benefits can be identified. The broad
coverage is consistent and not burdened by the easily manipulated,
formalistic categories that have plagued Anglo‐American common law
on both sides of the Atlantic. The coverage of work need not depend on
an employer’s control, as long as the work is to be done and is intended
to be done in the interests of the employer.95 Further, work covered
under this analysis is not limited to work rendered under a contract of
subordinate service rather than a contract for defined services.96 The
latter through specifications and conditions can be as fully aligned as
the former with the interests of a responsible employer.97 Even work
not integrated into the core of an employer’s business organization98
may be performed in full alignment with the interests of an employer
exercising control through contractual specifications.99 Finally, coverage
95

Cf. supra text accompanying notes 76‐86.
The Roman distinction between location operarum (contract for service) and locatio operis (contract of service)
indeed ultimately provides no more than different language to identify the categories of employees and
independent contractors. See Atiyah, supra note 78, at 35‐36 (“the use of such terms is just another way of stating
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See Julia Tomassetti, supra note 48, at 368‐389 (2014) (explaining how upfront contractual specifications can
preclude worker independence as effectively as can general authority to control service).
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As noted above, supra text accompanying note 43, the integration test was used by some British courts to
supplement a control test, especially for highly skilled employees like doctors who could not be placed under the
effective control of employers like hospitals. See also Giliker, supra note 76, at 60‐62, 69‐70, noting similar reasons
for use of organization or integration test in vicarious liability cases.
99
The test thus seems broader than the test advanced by Professor Collins in his creative attempt to formulate a
sophisticated new test. See Hugh Collins, Independent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical Disintegration to
Employment Protection Laws, 10 Oxford J. of Leg. Stud. 353, 377‐80 (1990). Collins states that task performance
contracts, which transfer economic risk to workers, should not be treated as employment contracts if the
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need not depend on the existence of a contract for future work,
whether or not with mutual obligations. The alignment‐reciprocal cost
internalization analysis of work can be applied ex post without
consideration of ex ante obligations.100

IV.

Using the Restatement of Employment Law

The importance of alignment analysis and a reciprocal cost
internalization basis for respondeat superior vicarious liability under
Anglo‐American common law should influence both American and
British policy makers to reconsider their formulations of a default
standard for the economic relationships protected by their
employment statutes. Even without statutory modifications, however,
at least American courts could move toward alignment analysis by use
of the recently adopted Restatement of Employment Law.
The final adopted draft, in the critical language of the
Restatement of Employment Law’s first section, 1.01, states that “an
individual renders services as an employee of an employer if … the
employer controls the manner and means by which the individual

organization has no techniques of control beyond checking the adequacy of service. See id. The alignment test may
have a broader scope where workers do not have adequate traditional or human capital to pursue independent
interests when performing their task contracts. See infra text accompanying note 103.
100
Cf. supra text accompanying note 48.

renders services, or the employer otherwise effectively prevents the
individual from render those services as an independent
businessperson. … An individual renders services as an independent
business person and not as an employee when the individual in his or
her own interest exercise entrepreneurial control over important
business decision, including whether to hire and where to assign
assistants, whether to purchase and where to deploy equipment, and
whether and when to provide service to other customers.”101
This formulation conveys the central idea that employees are
those rendering service without actual control over the use of capital,
including their own human capital, and the labor of others, to advance
their own interests independently of the interests of any possible
employers. Although the word “entrepreneurial” is used, the standard
is better encapsulated as an independent business standard than as an
entrepreneurial opportunity standard. The so‐called common law
standard of employer control over the manner and means of service is
presented as a sufficient but not necessary way by which an employer
prevents a controlled employee from operating an independent
business through the allocation of capital and labor. As explained in the
ALI‐adopted comments to the formulation,102 workers whose manner
101
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Restatement of Employment Law § 1.01(a)(3); (b).
Id. §1.01, comment d.

and means of work is controlled by another entity are not allowed to
make capital and labor allocation decisions for any independent
interests that are not fully aligned with those of the controlling entity.
Furthermore, as also explained in the comments,103 other workers,
including the managerial, skilled, and off‐site workers whose manner
and means of work are not controlled, still may be prevented from
rendering services in their independent interests by an alignment of
their duties with the interests of an employer. Stated most succinctly,
service is rendered as an employee rather than as an independent
business person when the service renderer does not render the service
with significant discretionary control over capital and labor. Retaining
such control enables a business person to advance their own economic
interests without also advancing proportionately the interests of
another party that has denied such control.
The default definition of employee stated in § 1.01 of the
employment restatement thus turns on the difference between
independent discretionary control over capital and labor, on the one
hand, and the lack of such control and the consequent alignment of the
worker’s service with the interests of a controlling entity, on the other.
This definition distinguishes employees due the protection and benefits
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Id. § 1.01, comment e.

of employment statutes primarily on the basis of relative need.
Workers in a developed capitalist economy who can render service with
control of capital and of labor are in a fundamentally stronger
economic position to protect their own interests and provide for their
own benefits than those who cannot.
Furthermore, the distinction between independent discretion and
controlled alignment also provides a basis for assigning responsibility
for the provision of benefits and protections by determining whether
there is another entity, or entities, that can more appropriately be
assigned responsibility for the protections and benefits than can the
workers themselves. If the workers do not have discretion to serve their
own independent interests, if their service is to be aligned with the
interests of a controlling entity, then that entity, or entities, can
appropriately be assigned responsibility for the protections and
benefits that the polity has determined are warranted by their work.
Where the legal or economic relationship empowers the party served
to prevent the service renderer from making decisions in its own
interest about how capital and labor are used in the course of the
service, there is an alignment of interests that warrants both
respondeat superior vicarious liability and a default assumption,
reversible of course in particular legislation, that the party who benefits

from the service should internalize the costs of ensuring statutory
protections and benefits for the server.
The consistency of the alignment‐reciprocal cost internalization
analysis with § 1.01 does not of course establish that the analysis is
mandated by common law decisions. As stated in the opening
paragraphs of this essay,104 the common law is malleable and open to
variant interpretations to provide legitimacy. The common law,
however, also provides insight into social values. The interpretation
given by § 1.01 and applied through an analysis supported by the policy
underlying respondeat superior liability not only draws from the insight
of the common law, but also is well within the bounds of interpretive
license.
In addition, this interpretation and analysis provides both a
compelling and easily applied standard. On the one hand, it sharply
distinguishes from employment status owners of independent
businesses operating in a raw material or component supply or
distribution chain. These independent businesses hire and assign
employees and deploy equipment and other capital in order to
maximize their own profits rather than those of other businesses that
the independent business owners benefit through sales or purchases.
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On the other hand, it highlights that individuals who provide
personal service to private or public enterprises do so as employees
unless they have control over substantial capital or significantly
differentiated human capital. Without such control, no service provider
while providing service to one enterprise can command the ability to
deploy capital or assign assistants in its independent interests. A
service provider without such control, like a plumber or a gardener or a
delivery driver, may have discretion to provide service to others when it
is not working for the enterprise, but unless such a provider has control
over sufficient capital to increase its profits without also
proportionately enhancing its service, the provider is serving the
enterprise as an employee.
The definition of employment focuses on whether particular
“service” or work is rendered as an employee, not on whether the
service renderer is an employee in the abstract. Thus, any individual
can render service to multiple employers in multiple employment
relationships seriatim. The fact that the plumber or gardener or
delivery driver without significant capital can serve other enterprises at
different times is not relevant to the question of whether particular
service is rendered within an employment relationship. The
Restatement of Employment indeed expressly anticipates seriatim
employment relationships, occurring within a “given day, week, or

other time period” in § 1.04(a).105 This also is in accord with how
respondeat superior would be applied. We would expect any principal
to be liable for the torts of an agent within the scope of their service,
regardless of how many other principals the agent served within any
given time period.106
V.

Applying Respondeat Superior and § 1.01
To illustrate further the clarity, coherence, and sense of the

interest alignment analysis drawn from vicarious liability and supported
by § 1.01 of the Employment Restatement, consider two overlapping
kinds of relationships with workers that are covered by interest
alignment analysis, but may be difficult for both American and British
tribunals applying their current tools of analysis. The first set of
relationships are ones in which an employer attempts to avoid
employment laws by requiring contracts that transfer to the workers
the risk of some limited control over marginal production costs.107
These contracts also may promise an opportunity for enhanced
105

Section 1.04(a) states in full: “An individual is an employee of two or more separate employers if (i) the
individual renders services to each of the employers on a separate basis during a given day, week, or other time
period and (ii) during such time period is subject solely to that employer’s control or supervision as provided in §
1.01(a)(3).”
106
See, e.g., Brasseaux v. Town of Mamou, 752 So.2d 815, 821 (La. 2000) (part‐time police officer). Not
surprisingly, employment laws generally do not exclude part‐time workers,
107
See, e.g., Corp. Express Delivery Sys. V. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. 2002) (owner‐operators may be treated as
employees under the NLRA); Ready Mixed Concrete Ltd. v Minister of Pensions and National Service, [1968] 2 Q.B.
497 (owner‐operators of lorries did not have contracts of employment). Compare also Roadway Package Sys., Inc.,
326 N.L.R.B. 842 (1998) (finding employee status), with Dial‐A‐Mattress Operating Corp., 326 N.L.R.B. 884 (1998)
(finding independent contractor status).

compensation through supervision of other employees. The transfer of
risk may be accomplished through requiring the employees to lease or
purchase, perhaps from the employer or through the employer’s
financing mechanism, and also to service, equipment like a truck or
lorry that is necessary for the employees’ work. The employer then
requires the workers to use the equipment in service to the employer
for periods and in a manner that make it very difficult, though perhaps
not impossible, for the worker to reap profits from other use. Most
importantly, the employer continues to set sufficient conditions on the
worker’s use of the capital equipment during the periods of service to
the employer to ensure that the worker’s obligations during these
periods are fully aligned with the interests of the employer.
FedEx, for instance, used this kind of system to cast the delivery
drivers performing its core service as independent contractors with
entrepreneurial opportunities and thus not subject to American
employment laws.108 FedEx required the drivers to work long hours
from Tuesday through Saturday, kept full control of the drivers’
territories and their compensation, determined the packages they
needed to deliver each day, and required the use of specified vehicles
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For an excellent analysis of FedEx’s business model, see Julia Tomassetti, From Hierarchies to Markets: FedEx
Drivers and the Work Contract as Institutional Marker, 19 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1083 (2015).

with FedEx logos.109 Numerous drivers thus challenged their
classification by FedEx as independent contractors.110 Some courts that
resisted classifying the drivers as employees were influenced in part by
FedEx’s allowing some drivers to be compensated for the hiring and
supervision of other drivers on their routes or even in multiple
routes.111 Some courts also were influenced by FedEx’s claims that the
drivers’ capital investment in their trucks provided them with an
entrepreneurial opportunity to adjust their returns, through their
responsibility for truck maintenance or their formal freedom to use the
trucks on off days or to sell their trucks along with the transfer of their
routes.112
Whatever the extent of the FedEx drivers’ limited control over
their trucks, or over other drivers on other routes, and the even more
limited extent to which this control was exercised, however, the drivers
were not able to deploy their trucks to serve their independent
109

See, e.g., FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 504, 510‐511 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Garland, dissenting)
(discussing the factual findings of the NLRB Regional Director). See also Tommasseti, supra note 108, at 1111 (and
cites therein).
110
See, e.g., Gray v.FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 799 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 2015) (rejecting summary judgment of
employee status); Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 792 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that drivers were
employees as a matter of Kansas law, based on certified opinion of Kansas Supreme Court); Carlson v. FedEx
Ground Package Sys., Inc., 787 F.3d. 1313 (11th Cir. 2015) (rejecting summary judgment of independent contractor
status); Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir.2014) (holding drivers were employees
as a matter of California law); FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that NLRB could
not protect drivers as employees).
111
See, e.g., Gray v. FedEx, supra note 110, at 1000; FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, supra note 110, at 290; In re
FedEx Grand Package System, Inc., 734 F.Supp. 2d 557, 562, 588‐89 (N.D. Ind. 2010).
112
See, e.g., Gray v. FedEx, supra note 110, at 1001; FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, supra note 110, at 291; In re
FedEx Grand Package System, Inc., supra note 111, at 596‐97.

interests during the periods in which they were obligated to deliver
FedEx packages on their own routes. They did not have any discretion
to enhance their returns for their delivery work during this period
except by advancing FedEx’s interests through delivering more
packages.113 They had no discretion to use cheaper trucks or other
equipment or to do other work during their mandated time of service
to FedEx; their obligations during these hours were fully aligned with
the interests of FedEx.114 Thus, just as FedEx, under this business
model, should have been vicariously liable to any third party injured by
a negligent FedEx driver during the delivery of FedEx packages, so
should FedEx have been responsible for any employment benefits and
protections, including for collective bargaining, associated with their
drivers’ work delivering packages for FedEx.
The second currently salient set of cases illuminated by interest
alignment analysis involve the assignment of work through a digital
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FedEx’s claim that the opportunity to transfer routes along with trucks made the drivers entrepreneurs seems
exaggerated because FedEx retained the discretion to reassign territory, and did so to maintain strict control over
the volume of work in each area. See Tomassetti, supra note 108, at 1111. Thus, a driver could not enhance the
value of a route for future sale by providing good service to attract additional customers.
114
Theoretically, drivers could marginally enhance or detract from their net returns for their hours of service to
FedEx by lower cost use of their trucks in anticipation of their ultimate sale when transferring their routes.
However, FedEx provided support for truck maintenance, taxes, and insurance, and exercised control over route
transfers. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 504, 510‐511 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Garland, dissenting).
Drivers who supervised other routes might have been able to enhance their independent returns if FedEx
permitted them to control costs on these routes, including the wages of subordinate drivers, but even if they
operated independent business through such supervision, they still were employees on their own routes. See Craig
v. FedEx Ground Package system, 300 Kan. 788, 828, 335 P.3d 66, 93 (2014) (holding under Kansas law that drivers
were employees on the routes they service personally even if responsible for other routes).

platform that neither provides any guarantee of work nor requires any
particular commitment to work.115 The absence of mutual
commitments indicates why digital platforms could pose difficulty for
the application of British statutes that condition coverage on the
existence of a contract of employment that requires mutual obligations.
However, as the example of Uber drivers demonstrates, digital
platforms have presented classification controversies for American
tribunals as well.116 Even liberal academics, like the economist Alan
Krueger and the law professor Seth Harris, both Obama administration
veterans,117 have taken the position that the discretion of workers like
Uber drivers to choose when to make themselves available to work
probably removes them from the status of employee under American
common law and requires the formulation of a new legal category of
“independent worker,” with some protections, not including the
minimum wage guaranteed employees covered by the FLSA.118
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For various discussions, see, e.g., Jeremias Prassl and Martin Risak, Uber, Taskrabbit, & Co., Platforms as
Employers? Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork, 2017 Comparative Labour Law and Pol. J. xxx; Rogers,
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Harris served, inter alia, as Deputy Secretary of Labor, and Krueger was Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisors.
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See Harris and Krueger, supra note 115, at 20.

Nevertheless, a decision of a British Employment Tribunal in
Aslam v Uber119 appropriately treated Uber drivers as workers under
the second “(b) limb” of the definition in the NMWA, the WTR
regulations, and the ERA,120 based on a rich contextual multifactor
analysis. Unlike the ex‐Obama administration officials, the Tribunal
recognized that the drivers were as much in need of the protection of
the applicable employment laws as drivers of a traditional
transportation company.121
Assigning the drivers an appropriate full employee status would
be much easier and more straightforward, however, under § 1.01 of the
Restatement of Employment Law, through analysis that asked simply
whether the drivers were able to utilize their capital and controlled
labor in their own interest without directly benefiting aligned Uber
interests in doing so. Working under the business relationships as
described in Aslam,122 the drivers could not. After logging on to make
themselves available for Uber‐solicited rides, the drivers had to accept
most fares that Uber offered.123 Uber set the price the riders paid,
119

Aslam v Uber BV [2017] I.R.L.R. 4, [2016] EW Misc B68 (ET).
See supra text accompanying notes and notes 56‐59.
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See Aslam, supra, at ¶¶ 85‐96.
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See Aslam, supra, at ¶¶ 15‐57. For another consistent description of the Uber business model, see O’Connor v.
Uber Techs., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135‐1137 ((N.D. Cal.2015) (denying Uber’s motion for summary judgment based
on claims drivers were independent contractors for purposes of California Labor Code). For a description of a
similar business model of Uber’s prime competitor, see Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1069‐1073 (N.D.
Cal. 2015) (denying cross motions for summary judgment on whether drivers are independent contractors or
employees for purposes of California Labor Code).
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See Aslam, supra, at ¶¶ 48, 51‐53.
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collected the fare, and paid the drivers a share.124 Uber also prohibited
the drivers from exchanging information to form future relationships
with riders.125 While in Uber’s pool of available drivers, drivers had no
discretion to use the limited capital invested in their cars in a way that
could benefit them without proportionately benefitting Uber.126 The
drivers’ duties were fully aligned with Uber’s interests.
Thus, just as Uber, under these business practices, should be
vicariously liable to riders or other third parties for injuries caused by
the negligence of Uber drivers, so should Uber presumably be
responsible for ensuring the protections and benefits defined in
employment statutes. An Uber driver’s ability to use a car at a different
time for the riders of a competitor like Lyft is irrelevant. The alignment
analysis is applied to particular work; as noted above,127 a worker may
have multiple employers seriatim.128
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See id. at ¶¶ 18‐21.
See id. at ¶ 50.
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The fact that drivers could use their vehicles at other times to serve other interests is irrelevant to the question
of whether an employer has sufficient control of the use of the vehicles during particular periods to ensure that
the vehicles use is aligned with its interests. To be an independent business person, a service worker during the
period of service must have control over the use of any relevant capital goods; ownership of the goods is not
sufficient. Furthermore, modern computer technology enables firms with more significant capital to exercise
periodic control of capital owned by service workers. See Julia Tomassetti, Does Uber Redefine the Firm? The
Postindustrial Corporation and Advanced Information Technology, 34 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L. J. 1, 63‐65 (2016).
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See supra text accompanying note 105.
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Some courts, however, have mistakenly treated the freedom of workers to work at different times for other
employers or even for themselves as a critical factor in disproving their employment during particular work for one
employer. See, e.g., Saleem v. Corp. Trasp. Group. 854 F.3d 131, 141‐144 (2d Cir. 2017) (issuing summary judgment
against black car drivers seeking employment status with dispatch company that negotiated fees with clients and
received a portion of the drivers’ fares). The Aslam tribunal, in contrast, appropriately, and in accord with the
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The work of service providers connected to clients or customers
by a digital platform need not be aligned with the interests of the
platform in all cases, however. While the tribunal in Aslam
appropriately rejected Uber’s claim that it sold only a passenger
software connection to drivers running their own businesses, if digital
workers merely pay their platform a flat facilitation or finder’s fee for
each connection129 and also retain discretion to bargain for their own
price, with the threat of non‐service, employee status is not
appropriate because the workers’ obligations are not aligned with the
interests of the platform. Worker obligations and platform interests
would not be aligned in that case because the platform benefits from
further connection fees made possible by satisfied customers who feel
they received a good bargain, while the workers are free to attempt to
reap greater benefits for themselves by deploying their labor and
capital at a higher price. The ability to take a higher proportion of a
higher price, perhaps through cost control discretion, as well as the
discretion to set a price,130 is necessary for independent business
Restatement of Employment Law, treated the time when the Uber drivers had their Uber‐app turned on as
separable from time when they might have worked for possible competitors.
129
In defending their treatment of drivers as independent businesses, Uber and Lyft have claimed to be mere
facilitators of a product market between drivers and riders. See Tomassetti, supra note 126, at 13‐16. This claim
fails because the firms assign particular drivers and take a percentage of the fares they set rather than take a set
fee and allow a free market to set fare levels. See id. at 23‐28.
130
Taxi drivers who must charge regulated fares, but pay a dispatching firm only a set fee to lease their cabs, rather
than any portion of their fares, still may provide service in alignment with the interests of a dispatching firm
exercising quality control to ensure well served and satisfied customers. The drivers can make more money only by
working harder, rather than by any entrepreneurial allocation of capital or the labor of others. See, e.g., Yellow Cab
Cooperative, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 226 Cal. App.3d 1288, 277 Cal. Rptr. 434 (Ct. of App., 1st Dist.

status, however. Even if a worker is delegated price setting discretion
for a business, as long as the business reaps a percentage of the net
returns for the worker’s service, the worker’s service obligations stay
closely aligned with the interests of the business.131
In the real commercial world, most digital platforms, like Uber,
charge a percentage commission to align their interests with the duties
of workers to serve the platforms’ clients or customers.132 Most
platforms also do not afford discretion to workers to pursue their
independent interests by bargaining for special, higher returns from
clients or customers identified by the platforms.133 Thus, most work
assigned or obtained through a platform should qualify as fully
protected employment.134

1991) (lessor cab company exercised sufficient control over lessee drivers to be employer for purposes of workers’
compensation law).
131
The alignment is close but admittedly not perfect, however, in a case where workers have some control of costs
through use of their own capital on jobs for which they have discretion to set prices. For instance, if Uber drivers
could set prices for rides in vehicles they owned, the drivers rationally would prefer to set higher prices than would
Uber sharing proportionately in the fares. This is because the drivers would have to pay for depreciation of their
vehicle. Because there presumably is less depreciation if there are fewer rides at higher rates, drivers would
benefit a little more from higher prices than would Uber. In addition, a rider’s dissatisfaction from having to pay a
high fee might be directed to some extent at all Uber drivers, while the driver charging the high fee reaped all of
the driver’s proportion of that fee.
132
Mechanical Turk, Task Rabbit, and Upwork, for instance, all impose fees set as a percentage of the payment to
workers. See Harris and Kreuger, supra note115, at 31‐32; www.mturk.com; www.upwork.com;
www.taskrabbit.com.
133
As long as it takes a commission, a platform can align its interests with individual workers’ duties even if, like
Upwork, see supra note 132, it allows its clients or customers to set price levels for variant tasks. Employer status
for a platform that commands a percentage commission only should be denied for a platform that connects clients
with businesses that can perform a task with discretion to allocate capital and labor for their own profit. By cutting
costs, such businesses have discretion to pursue independent higher profits at any commission level.
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Indeed, in cases where workers do not exercise control over their own capital or have the ability to assign labor
during performance of a task assigned through the platform, the workers may be jointly employed by the served
client as well as by the platform. See infra text accompanying notes 165‐171.

This protection of work secured through digital platforms should
not be limited to certain statutes because the work is casual or part
time, or because the work was not performed under a “global” or
“umbrella” contract with a mutuality of obligations. First, contrary to
the assertion of Harris and Krueger, the coverage of most platform
workers, no more than the coverage of other causal or part time
workers, poses no intractable problem for benefits or protections that
“depend on the measurement of working hours.”135 Harris and Krueger
contend that the inability to determine the hours of digital workers like
Uber drivers with discretion to decide when and how long to work, and
even whether to work for competitors, means that they cannot be
assured a minimum wage under the FLSA. As the Tribunal in Aslam
explained, however, the Uber drivers were at work for Uber whenever
they logged on to the Uber app and made themselves available for an
Uber assignment.136 Similarly, under the FLSA, workers unable to attend
to personal business during hours while waiting on‐call from their
employer must be compensated for those hours.137 Indeed, computer‐
based records make the determination of on‐call work hours easier in
the modern economy. Such records also can be used to determine
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Harris and Kreuger, supra note 115, at 20.
See Aslam, supra note 119, at ¶¶ 85‐86.
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See, e.g., Halferty v. Pulse Drug Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1989) (“whether the employee can use the
[on‐call] time effectively for his or her own purposes” is critical issue). See generally Eric Phillips, On‐Call Time Under
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 95 Mich L. Rev. 2633 (1997).
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whether the worker has worked enough hours for enough weeks over a
long enough period of time to meet other statutory minima for benefits
such as family leave, sick pay, holiday pay, redundancy pay, or even
protection from unfair dismissal in the United Kingdom. There may
have to be adjustments from the default coverage rule advocated here
for maximum hour or overtime rules for workers who unilaterally can
set unlimited long hours, free from employer pressure, but such
adjustments do not require adoption of a general intermediate
category of workers no less in need of most employment protections
and benefits.
Second, the explanation offered by the Aslam Tribunal of how the
Uber drivers met the requirement of there being a “contract” under
limb (b) of the definition of worker in the statutes applicable to the
case also can be used to cover the drivers as employees under limb
(a).138 If, as stated by the Tribunal, there is no need for an “overarching
‘umbrella’ contract” for there to be a “’worker’ contract” covering
periods during which a driver has the driver’s “App switched on” and is
able and willing to accept assignments within an authorized territory,139
there also can be a contract of employment for even those short
periods. Just as American law does not require an intermediate
138
139

For the full definition, see supra note 38.
Aslam, at ¶¶ 85, 86.

category for protected workers who are not employees, British law
should not distinguish between employees and workers for purposes of
some critical statutory protections.
VI.

Jointly Responsible Employers
The kind of contracts treated in Aslam v. UBER as sufficient for

worker status, using the “contract of employment” model as a
condition of responsibility for employment protections, nonetheless
poses even greater problems in the U.K. in cases where an employee’s
duties are aligned with the interests of multiple parties, but the
employee is in privity of contract with only one.140 Joint responsibility
for the torts of controlled workers has been recognized by American
courts,141 however, and can be supported by the controlling principle of
reciprocal cost internalization that underlies respondeat superior
liability. Under similar analysis, in some cases more than one employer
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British law of vicarious liability also has been hostile to the joint liability of two employers since dicta in Laugher
v. Pointer [1826] 5 B. & C. 547, 558: “The law does not recognize a several liability in two principals who are
unconnected.” See also, e.g., Mersey Docks & Harbour Board v. Coggins & Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd; sub nom.
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Transfer (Northern) Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1151; [2006] Q.B. 510 (finding two employers liable for the negligence of
one employee that served both). The American vicarious liability law recognized joint vicarious liability earlier. See,
e.g., Siidekum v. Animal Rescue League, 353 Pa. 408, 45 Atl. 2d 59 (1946).
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See, e.g., Morgan v. ABC Mfr., 710 So. 2d 1077, 1085 (La. 1998); Vargo v. Sauer, 457 Mich. 49, 69, 576 N.W. 2d
656 (1998). See also Kelley v. Southern Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318 (1974) (application under the Federal Employers’
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51‐60); Restatement Second, Agency §§ 226 (“person may be the servant of two masters
… at one time as to one act, if the service to one does not involve abandonment of the service to the other”).

can be assigned responsibility for ensuring to particular workers the
protections and benefits promised by modern employment statutes
Section 1.04(b) of the Restatement of Employment Law restated
American law’s recognition of the possible responsibility of multiple
entities to internalize the same costs of employee protections and
benefits. The section states that an “an individual is an employee of
two or more joint employers if (i) the individual renders services to at
least one of the employers and (ii) that employer and other joint
employers each control or supervise such rendering of services as
provided” in the section defining the employment relationship
discussed above.142
This Restatement section reflects American judicial and
administrative decisions recognizing “joint employer” responsibilities
for the provision of protections and benefits secured by employment
statutes.143 Joint employers are distinct from single employers under
American law. Single employers are under common ownership and
control and thus do not have distinct ultimate interests.144 Joint
142

Restatement of Employment Law § 1.04(b) (2015).
See, e.g., Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964) (finding joint employment under the NLRA); Rutherford
Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947) (finding joint employment under the FLSA); Grace v. USCAR, 521 F.3d
655, 667 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding joint employment under the Family Medical Leave Act); Antenor v. D. & S. Farms,
88 F.3d 925, 938 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding joint employment under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Protection Act); Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch, 611 F. Supp. 344, 349 (S.D. N.Y. 1984) (finding joint employment under
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
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Determination of single employer status, for instance, is critical for regulation of overtime under the FLSA. See,
e.g., Chao v. A‐One Med. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 917 (“Whether two companies constitute a single enterprise
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employers do have distinct interests. Nonetheless, particular work and
thus particular workers can serve the interests of joint employers
simultaneously if the interests of each do not conflict with respect to
that particular work. This will be the case where the best rendering of
particular efficient service to one employer serves the interests of a
second employer.
As will be explained more fully below, the rendering of efficient
service to one employer can serve the aligned interests of a second
employer in at least four kinds of relationships between the two
employers. First, it can do so where one employer is paid for
administering personnel policy, including staffing and hiring,
termination, compensation and benefits, for a second employer that
directs the performance of work in its interests.145 Second, it can do so
where one employer both generally controls the work and
compensation of the employees as a service to a set of customers who
have some discretion to direct the service in their interest and also
ultimately pay for the employees’ compensation.146 Third, it can do so
where one employer is compensated by a second employer for

for FLSA coverage and whether they are liable as joint employers … are technically separate issues.”). See also 29
C.F.R. § 779.203. American labor law also uses a “single employer” doctrine for determining collective bargaining
responsibilities. See South Prairie Construction Co. v. Local No. 627, Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, 425 U.S.
800 (1976).
145
See infra text accompanying note 164.
146
See infra text accompanying notes 165‐174.

ensuring that work serves the interests of the second employer.147 And,
fourth, it may do so where the second employer otherwise has
sufficient control over the first employer to ensure that the work is
aligned with interests of the first employer that do not conflict with
interests of its own.148
Assigning joint and several responsibility to two employers for the
provision of the same employment benefits of course does not mean
that an employee can receive double benefits any more than vicarious
liability can result in double recovery for an injured third party. One
employer must be assigned primary liability, presumably the employer
most directly involved in the denial of the benefit. The most direct
involvement usually is not difficult to identify, whether the denial of a
benefit or protection comes from a discriminatory or unfair discharge, a
nonpayment of a wage, the allowance of discriminatory harassment, an
unsafe work place, or a refusal to discharge a duty to bargain
collectively.149 Any judicial determination of primary responsibility, in
any event, can be obviated by indemnification agreements between the
employers, which always can be negotiated in contractual relationships.
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Assigning responsibility to both employers thus is most important in
cases where the employer that seems to have the most direct
involvement is insolvent.
Assigning responsibility for protections or benefits associated with
particular work to a second, less directly involved enterprise whose
interests are aligned with this work provides a more meaningful limit
on expanded responsibility than does relying on the “dependence” of
the first employer on the second. Assigning responsibility for one
directly involved employer’s employment law violations to a second
employer because of the first employer’s economic “dependence” on
the second, as suggested by some American courts applying an
“economic realities” test,150 the Department of Labor in the Obama
administration,151 and some commentators,152 could expand liability to
totally independent businesses. Small businesses, such as restaurants,
pharmacies, and barber shops, for instance, may be completely
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“dependent” on the continued proximate presence of a large
manufacturing plant or office building. Clearly, the enterprise operating
the plant or office building should not be responsible for the protection
of one of the small business’s employees.
To be sure, in the case of proximate small businesses dependent
on the presence of large independent employers, there is not a
contractual relationship between the small business and the large
business on which assignment of primary responsibility and cost
internalization could be based. Even when there is a contractual
relationship between two fully independent businesses with somewhat
opposed interests, however, the mere dependence of one on the other
does not make a strong case for the assignment of responsibility to the
second for the protection of the employees of the first.
Assume, for instance, that a manufacturer of specialized tubing
sells a substantial majority of its tubing at a negotiated price to one
pipeline manufacturer. Work at the tubing production plant benefits
the pipeline manufacturer, and the pipeline’s manufacturer’s payments
for the tubing influences the compensation of the tubing company’s
employees. Nonetheless, the tubing work is performed under the
direction and control of the tubing company’s managers aligned only
with the tubing company’s interests. The tubing company’s

management decides how much capital and what type is to be used in
production. This management also decides how much and what quality
of labor to employ and how that labor is to be motivated. These
decisions are made in the ultimate interests of the tubing company, not
in those of the pipeline manufacturer. The tubing company wants to
satisfy the pipeline manufacturer at the lowest production costs
possible. The manufacturer wants the best quality product possible at
the price for which it has contracted. Even if the pipeline manufacturer
limits the pay of the tubing company’s employees by what it pays for
tubing, an alignment‐of‐interests analysis explains why the tubing
manufacturer’s economic dependence on the pipeline manufacturer
provides an insufficient basis for the pipeline manufacturer’s
responsibility for the tubing manufacturer’s employees.153
The alignment of interests test thus denies joint employer status
based on mere economic dependence or dominance, but it also
illuminates why such status is appropriate in the four situations noted
above. The clearest case for joint employment is provided by the first of
these situations, where one employer is paid for administering
personnel policy for a second employer that directs the performance of
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See, e.g., Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, 72,109 Cal. Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259 (2010) (produce merchant’s
ability to leverage payments to farm producer could influence farm worker pay, but did not make merchant
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work in its interests. However, this case has posed a difficult problem
for U.K. law.
The problem for U.K. law has derived in part from conditioning
employment status on the existence of a “contract of employment.”
Workers supplied, compensated, and administered by an employment
agency whose business is the provision of temporary workers do not
have any actual contract with a client or user enterprise that directs
their work in this client’s interest.154 The workers’ only formal
contractual relationship is with the employment agency, which in turn
is in privity with the client or user enterprise. Thus, the suggestion in
some British cases that temporary agency workers may have an implied
contract of employment with the end user has not proven to be
durable.155
Some earlier decisions, moreover, had held the employment
agency’s contract with the workers not to be a contract of
employment156 because the agency has no obligation to provide, and
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the workers no obligation to accept, further work.157 Though decisions
now recognize as adequate the temporary worker’s contract with the
agency during a single engagement with the user employer,158 these
engagements are often too short to ensure coverage under statutes
that require a qualifying period.159 Moreover, some decisions held that
an employment agency in any event could not be an employer of
workers who were not subject to its control at their work place.160
The problem of having no responsible employer has been
addressed under the Working Time Regulations and the National
Minimum Wage Act by assigning a contractual obligation to the
employer with the responsibility to compensate the workers in cases
where a contract between the worker and one of the employers
otherwise cannot be found.161 Like the limb (b) definition of worker,
however, this does not cover some of the employment benefits and
protections offered by UK law.162 Furthermore, no U.K. law or decisions
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seems to recognize expressly that both an employment agency and an
end user employer could be responsible for ensuring minimum benefits
or protections.163
In the United States, where an employment relationship can exist
in the absence of a formal contractual relationship, there has been
recognition that an end user can be a joint employer of employees
supplied by a staffing agency that supplies and manages the benefits
and compensation of employees in behalf of the end user.164 Thus, §
1.04(b) of the Restatement of Employment requires only that a jointly
employed worker provide service to at least one of the employers, and
that both employers each control or supervise the rendering of services
in order to ensure the alignment required for employment status by §
1.01.
The alignment of interests condition is regularly met for both
employers in the case of workers supplied and administered by
temporary staffing agencies because the staffing agency is best served
when the temporary employees provide the best service to the
interests of the user employer. Effective service of the user employer
163
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See, e.g., Grace v. USCAR, 521 F.3d 655, 667 (6th Cir. 2008).

will more likely result in a continuation of the compensated commercial
relationship between the two employers that is in the interest of the
staffing agency.
Note, however, that this confluence of interests between the
staffing agency and the user employer may not exist if the staffing
agency is paid only a fee for the provision of workers rather than for a
continuing administration of their benefits or other personnel matters.
While the good will of the staffing agency would be impaired by
referring workers that provided ineffective service, a staffing agency
that collects fees only for placement may not have the same
investment in the continuing service of the employment of those it
places. A staffing agency that collects only a placement fee, for
instance, would gain no continuing benefit if a user employer extended
a worker’s service after finding the worker particularly productive.
The alignment of interest analysis also applies in the same manner
to a more traditional staffing agency that places workers for temporary
service through a digital platform with a client that directs the workers
service in its interests. If the digital platform is paid a continuing fee for
managing the benefits and personnel file of the temporary employee,
its interests in the workers’ effective service are aligned with those of
the user employer. If the digital platform is paid only a placement fee,

rather than a share of salary, however, and also has no continuing
involvement in the administration of the workers’ service, it does not
have aligned interests and is not a joint employer.
Two problematic British cases illustrate the second type of joint
employment alignment, where one employer generally controls both
the work and compensation of the employees as a service to a set of
customers who ultimately pay for the compensation and have sufficient
discretion to direct the service to ensure alignment with their interests.
In Cheng Yuen v. Royal Hong Kong Club,165 a golf club trained,
disciplined, assigned, and compensated at a set fee caddies who
assisted the club’s members during their golfing rounds. The club
debited the members for the caddies’ services. The caddies’ responsive
services thus were aligned with the interests both of the club and of the
members, although the Privy Council, denying an option of joint
employment, viewed the members as the caddies’ only employers.166
Another example is provided by the more recent case of
Stringfellow Restaurants Ltd v. Quashie.167 The worker in that case
claimed that a club employed her as a lap dancer during periods when
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she performed in the club at fees she negotiated with the club’s clients.
The club required her and other dancers to observe its rules on dress
and behavior under the supervision of the club’s “house mother.” The
club required the dancers to deposit all of their fees from the clients
with the club, from which the club deducted session fees, percentage
commissions, and fines. The club retained full discretion to determine
whether and when the dancers would be allowed to dance.
The case may seem more difficult because it might be argued that
the dancers’ interests were not fully aligned with those of the club
when setting their fees and performances; although higher fees would
mean more commissions for the club, lower fees for more service
would attract more clients and enable the club to charge more for
client entrance and diluted drinks. Nonetheless, the club’s almost
complete control over the dancers while they were in the club probably
was sufficient to ensure that pricing and performance was in line with
the club’s interests.168
In some cases the clients of digital platforms might be joint
employers along with the platforms of workers assigned by the
platforms. This is probably not the case for Uber’s drivers. Because
Uber controls its drivers’ routes, vehicles, and fares, 169 Uber passengers
168
169
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See supra text accompanying notes 124‐126.

cannot ensure their drivers’ direct service of their interests, as might
the golfers in Cheng Yeun and the bar patrons in Stringfellow. However,
clients of a platform that takes a percentage commission, but allows
the clients some discretion to control the work and negotiate a fee, are
similar to the golfers and bar patrons.
Neither the Aslam tribunal nor other tribunals have been asked to
find a joint employment relationship in cases involving platforms
because no one has claimed the clients to be employers. The lack of
such claims is not surprising for several reasons, including the absence
of continuing service to particular clients. That absence of continuity
presents a legal hurdle for liability under employment laws in the
U.K.170 and a logistical hurdle for employment laws in the U.S.171
The third type of continuing joint employer relationship based on
aligned interests, where one employer is compensated by a second
employer for ensuring that work serves the interests of the second
employer, has posed particular problems even for American legal
doctrine that recognizes the possibility of joint employment. The
problems have become more salient as what Hugh Collins almost three
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decades ago termed the “vertical disintegration” of modern capitalist
economic production systems has proceeded apace.172
The most important aspect of this disintegration, more recently
and famously termed “fissuring” by David Weil,173 the last
Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department
Secretary of Labor in the Obama administration, is not the formal
conversion of individual employees into independent contractors, but
rather the increased division of operational responsibilities through
out‐sourcing or subcontracting. Much of this increased fissuring has
been driven by financial calculations that more specialized businesses
concentrating on what are called “core competencies” can be more
efficient.174 Much of it also has resulted from labor cost savings that
derive from subcontractors being able to use lower compensated
workers from secondary labor markets not as available for central
businesses that require a more permanent, skilled, and highly
compensated internal labor market where workers are attuned to
horizontal equity in wages.175 Some of it, however, may derive from

172

See Collins, supra note 99.
See David Weil, The Fissured Workplace: Why Work Became So Bad for So Many and What Can Be Done to
Improve It (2014).
174
See, e.g., id. at 49‐52; Collins, supra note 99, at 356‐58.
175
See, e.g., Collins, supra note 99, at 360: Weil, supra note 173, at 85‐88; Davidov, Joint Employer Status in
Triangular Employment Relationships, supra note 152, at 730‐31.
173

secondary labor market contractors being less concerned with the
reputational costs of compliance with employment laws.176
Applying an alignment of interests test does not impose joint
employer business status on all central business operations benefitted
by subcontracting. Even a subcontractor attractive to a central business
because of lower labor costs partially based on reduced compliance
with employment statutes may control its workers to advance interests
not fully aligned with those of the central business. Consider, for
instance, the usual subcontracting of cleaning services for hospitals,
office buildings, commercial stores, and manufacturing plants. Cleaning
subcontractors chosen because of their low labor costs, even if in part
associated with noncompliance with employment laws, may be free to
assign and direct their employees and allocate their limited capital in
their own interest of doing satisfactory work at the lowest cost. The
somewhat misaligned interests of the office buildings are to receive the
highest quality service possible, not just satisfactory service, at the
contracted for price.
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In some cases, however, a central business hires subcontractors
to reduce labor costs without allowing the work they supply to deviate
from alignment with the interests of the central business. These
subcontracts produce a joint employer relationship. Consider the stated
facts of the controversial 2015 Browning‐Ferris Industries of California,
Inc. (BFI) case, upon which the Labor Board based a finding of joint
employment.177 BFI operated a recycling facility for the sorting of
materials into separate commodities to be sold to other businesses. BFI
directly employed around the facility some managers, some
supervisors, and some skilled specialists, including operators of heavy
equipment who were represented by a union.178 The main operation
inside the facility consisted of several conveyor belts, from which
relatively unskilled workers stood on platforms to sort through passing
material.179 The sorters were supplied by a subcontractor, which
processed their compensation and provided direct supervision of their
work. The subcontractor also supplied, compensated, and directly
177
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supervised other relatively unskilled workers who cleared jams and
cleaned the sorters and the rest of the facility.180 The recycling business
reimbursed the subcontractor for the subcontractors’ workers
compensation, adding a percentage mark‐up pursuant to what was
essentially a cost plus contract.181 The subcontractor could set
compensation levels, as long as they were below the pay range set by
the recycler for its own directly employed workers.182 The recycler,
however, could terminate the subcontract, including for excessive cost,
with thirty days of notice.183 The recycling business’s management
retained and used authority to reject any of the workers supplied by
the subcontractor and to initiate discipline of any of these workers.184
The recycling management controlled the pace and hours of work by
setting the operation, breaks, and speed of the conveyor belts.185 The
recycling management also determined where the sorters and other
supplied workers were to work and monitored their work hours to
ensure they were not overstated.186 Furthermore, the recycler’s
supervisors determined daily operational plans and directed the
subcontracting supervisors.187 In addition to giving instructions to the
180
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subcontractor’s employees indirectly through the subcontractor’s
supervisors, the recycler’s supervisors retained and sometimes used
authority to issue direct instructions to the subcontractor‐supplied
workers, even when those instructions countermanded directions from
the subcontractor’s supervisors.188
This scenario presents an example of joint employment under
interest alignment analysis. Through its discretion to terminate the
cost–plus subcontract, the recycling company was able to ensure that
the subcontractor’s workers were paid as it wished. Furthermore, by its
oversight of the supervisors of the subcontractor’s workers at the
recycler’s plant, as well as by its direct control of the pacing and timing
of work, and of the subcontractor’s workers, the recycler’s
management could ensure that these workers’ service was directly
aligned with the interests of the recycler.
The Board did not suggest that the relationship between the
recycler and the subcontractor was that of a single integrated
employer. The subcontractor was not under the general control of the
recycler; it presumably operated its central administrative offices
independently and serviced other clients as a provider and supervisor
of work. The particular work at the recycler’s plant, however, was
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under the ultimate control of the recycler; the recycler had sufficient
control to ensure that these workers did not generate returns for the
subcontractor at its expense rather than for its benefit. The workers
efforts were fully aligned with the interests of the recycler. Thus, the
recycler was a joint employer and should be subject to both vicarious
liability for the torts of the subcontractor’s employees and also
responsibility to ensure that these employees receive the guarantees of
employment protection and benefit statutes.
Given the mandate from Congress to use a common law test for
defining the employment relationship,189 the Board in BFI
understandably at least purported to apply a joint employer standard
based on the common law.190 The common law provides the Board with
a cloak of legitimacy, just as it has provided such a cloak for the
Supreme Court.191 But because the common law standard remains
murky and undefined by a social policy‐justified ultimate question to be
answered, the Board’s standard is less clear and more vulnerable to
criticism. Used as explanation and justification, the alignment analysis
suggested by the common law insight provided by the law of
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respondeat superior could provide a firmer foundation for joint
employer findings in cases like BFI.
Alignment analysis also would supply a firmer foundation for
finding joint employment relationships in the fourth type of case where
they may exist, where the second employer otherwise has sufficient
control over the first employer to ensure that the work is aligned with
interests of the first employer that do not conflict with interests of its
own. This type of case is similar to the third type, but it differs because
the second employer’s control over the first employer may not be
limited to authority secured by contract to issue directions to the first
employer to provide and manage workers in the second employer’s
behalf. The control may derive from a more complicated economic
relationship between the two employers.
The paradigm case is the relationship between some brand
franchisors and some franchisee businesses. Treating individual
workers as franchisees may be a sham to avoid employment status.192
True franchisees, by contrasts, contribute significant capital that they
have some discretion to control in their own interests, independent of
those of their franchisors. Indeed, franchising presumably has
proliferated and been successful because it enlists franchises to raise
192
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capital quickly for expansion193 while also providing incentives –
probably greater than those for managers in a large business hierarchy
‐‐ for the franchisees to sell the franchisor’s brand.194
Franchisor control over the operations of franchisees varies across
a broad spectrum. The grant of a franchise may be little more than the
authorization of the use of a trademark for purposes of product
distribution, without any restriction on the franchisee’s control of its
methods of operation.195 Even franchisors that demand franchisees
adopt a particular business format and maintain specific brand quality
may cede some discretion to their franchisees to make certain
operational decisions, at least subject to a right of review. Such
operational discretion may cover advertising, building maintenance and
decoration, and some supply contracts.196 The ceded discretion also
may include control over the franchisees’ workers, including their
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hiring, firing, discipline, compensation, staffing assignments, and
working hours.
Franchise agreements that allow franchisees to maintain control
over the identity, compensation, and allocation of their workers do not
establish joint employment, because such agreements do not fully align
the duties of the franchisees’ employees with the interests of the
franchisors as well as those of the franchisees. The franchisees’
interests may conflict in part with the interests of their franchisor
because the typical franchise agreement requires the franchisee to pay
royalties calculated as a percentage of revenues, in addition to an initial
investment and the rental of any franchisor property used by the
franchisee.197 Higher profit margins that derive from cost‐cutting labor
allocation decisions thus benefit the franchisee, while somewhat
different labor allocation decisions that might enhance service could
result in increased sales that would provide benefit to the franchisor.198
Furthermore, a franchisor can maintain control of its brand reputation
by maintaining control over the content and presentation of its
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branded product without aligning a franchisee’s capital and labor
allocation decisions with its interests.199
The hopes of franchisees to maintain, or expand, profitable
franchisee operations, however, are dependent upon staying in the
good graces of their franchisor.200 The generally dominant economic
and legal position of the franchisor thus provides the potential for the
franchisor to control franchisee decisions relevant to the alignment of
workers’ duties and efforts. A franchisor could exercise its dominant
economic position to induce a franchisee to control its employees to
serve the franchisee in a manner that fully aligns with the interests of
the franchisor. Though a franchisor’s mere potential dominance over a
franchisee should not suffice to establish joint employment, it does
warrant consideration of whether the franchisor has been coordinating
the franchisees’ control over its employees to align with its interests.
That coordination could be demonstrated, for instance, by a
franchisee’s general acceptance of overall employment policies set in
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software provided by the franchisor,201 software that presumptively
would not direct the franchisee against the franchisor’s own interest.202
Establishing a franchisor’s control over a franchisee’s workers, no
more than establishing a contractor’s control over the alignment of the
work of a subcontractor’s employees or a user employer’s control over
a temporary agency’s employees, does not establish a single employer
relationship. A franchisor is primarily interested in enhancing the
reputation and aggregate sales of its branded products, while the
franchisee cares about the profits of its owned outlets and less about
the general reputation of the brand.203 Thus, to the extent a
franchisee’s ownership and management may make independent
decisions about the deployment of their capital to enhance and market
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Many franchisors now provide such software, though its use may be optional. See Ochoa v. McDonald’s, supra
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defendants’ store and included a system of tracking hours and wages and retaining payroll records which was
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In 2015 the General Counsel of the NLRB filed a series of complaints against McDonald’s, charging the
major fast food franchisor with responsibility as a joint employer for a number of unfair labor practices alleged
against some of its franchisees. The General Counsel’s case, as presented before an administrative law judge, was
based in part on evidence that McDonald’s encourages its franchisees to use McDonald’s sophisticated software to
reduce labor costs by determining the operational placement, compensation, and working times of the
franchisees’ employees. The General Counsel’s evidence may have suggested that McDonald’s encouragement of
the use includes effective conditioning of franchise renewal and expansion on the franchisee’s acceptance of
directions given by the software. Whether or not the General Counsel’s evidence was sufficient to make the case
that McDonald’s exerts effective control over franchisee employees to align their work closely with negotiated
franchisor‐franchisee interests, it is not difficult to imagine such effective control being imposed through modern
technology. See Tomassetti, supra note 126, at 63‐66.
McDonald’s responsibilities for at least some of the alleged unfair labor practices need not have turned on
a finding of its joint employer status, however. See infra text accompanying note 209.
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their particular franchise, they will not do so in full alignment with the
interests of their franchisor. With sufficient franchisor control over a
franchisee’s employees’ work, a joint employment relationship can
exist in a franchising relationship without the franchise being part of
the franchisor’s single operations.

VII. Departure from the Default Rules for Multiple Employer
Responsibilities
The trans‐Atlantic applicability of interest alignment analysis as a
default standard does not mean that it should never be qualified or
modified for administrative convenience or to serve the purposes of a
particular statute. For instance, the protection of some casual or part
time work needful of employment protections and benefits because
performed without discretionary control over the allocation of
significant capital or labor may be administratively difficult. Such
difficulties may arise when work, whether or not located through an
online intermediary, involves service rendered independently to
individual customers or clients outside the control of an assigning
employer. As effectively recognized in the limb (b) section in the
definition of worker in the U.K. statutes,204 the only responsible
employers for such work could be the customers or clients served. In
many instances, however, a casual worker, like a yard worker or house
cleaner, without control of significant capital, may not have a sufficient
relationship with such customers or clients to make enforcement of
employment laws against them practical or even desirable. The work
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often is performed for a private customer’s ultimate consumption
rather than to further production of an enterprise, and it is often for
periods too short to trigger statutory employee benefits or protections.
In order to provide equal social protection, the state may have to
provide supplementary benefits, such as unemployment or other
supplementary compensation and vacation pay, for sporadic part time
work for the consumption of householders or other customers, without
attempting to assign responsibility to a series of employers with aligned
interests.
Furthermore, if some other manageable boundaries can be set, a
developed economy like those of the U.S. and U.K. may wish to provide
supplementary benefits even for some work outside the boundaries set
for employment by alignment analysis. For instance, we may wish to
offer supplementary benefits to independent yard workers or house
cleaners without capital to allocate but who are not employees of the
householders they serve because they can use other workers as
assistants and can adjust the timing of their work. We also may wish to
offer supplementary social benefits to workers with limited capital such
as an automobile, which they are free to use in their own interests at
their own fares and routes, and without any direction from any
assignment platform.

There have been analogous recent expansions of respondeat
superior vicarious liability in special circumstances based on strong
policy rationales. For instance, courts have found employers to be
vicariously liable for their agents’ sexual misconduct outside the scope
of employment where the agents have used special power afforded by
their positions over the vulnerable injured third parties. Thus,
employers have been found vicariously liable for the sexual misconduct
of police officers, therapists, and nurses.205 Interpreting Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act,206 the United States Supreme Court also has
crafted vicarious liability doctrine, qualified by an affirmative defense,
to impose liability on employers for supervisors’ discriminatory
harassment of subordinate employees, even though such harassment is
outside the scope of employment.207 These expansions of vicarious
liability doctrine can be supported by an argument that the employers
benefitted from the delegation of authority used by the tortfeasing
agents, even if not from the course of conduct in which the torts were
committed.
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I note four additional possible expansions of responsibility beyond
the boundaries set by the symmetrical cost internalization principle
that underlies respondeat superior. First, and most obviously, we may
wish to apply anti‐discrimination prohibitions to commercial
relationships with independent contractors as well as to employment
relationships with workers who do not have discretion to operate
independent businesses. American law, for instance, prohibits race
discrimination in all contracts.208
More generally, any statutory provisions that do not merely
require the provision of benefits, but also proscribe particular
affirmative conduct, might be applied not only against joint employers
with interests aligned with the work of the employee victims, but also
against other entities that have some indirect culpability through the
encouragement or facilitation of the discriminatory or other prohibited
conduct. This liability would be better characterized as analogous to
direct rather than vicarious liability because it is based on the fault of
the facilitating employer rather than on its responsibilities to protect its
employees. For instance, a franchisor or a contractor that insisted or
even advised that certain of its franchisee’s or subcontractor’s
employees be discharged because of their union involvement should be
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guilty of an unfair labor practice under the NLRA regardless of whether
or not it is a joint employer of the discharged workers.209
Third, arguments based on efficiency and distributive justice that
have supported respondeat superior liability,210 as qualified by
considerations of reciprocal cost internalization, might be used with
less qualification to expand the employers responsible for the denial of
benefits promised by particular employment statutes. Thus, some
concerned with the thin capitalization and potential insolvency of
certain employers have argued that any entity in a distributional or
supply chain should have secondary responsibility for ensuring wages
required by the FLSA proportionate to its use of the inadequately
compensated work.211 Indemnification clauses could ensure the
assignment of primary responsibility as there would always be
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The Labor Board has held in a series of cases that without being deemed a joint employer for purposes of
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contractual relationships up and down supply and distributional
chains.212 Even with the insulation of such clauses, however, large
companies at the center of supply chains would have incentives to
protect their brands through monitoring of smaller companies in the
chain, and public authorities could use this monitoring for more
efficient enforcement.213
Fourth, I have argued elsewhere that the American law governing
collective bargaining should provide workers who choose collective
representation the right to bargain collectively with commercial entities
that own and derive profit from the capital that the workers directly
help make productive.214 I argued that workers should be able to
attempt to share in any rent that the owners of the capital have been
able to extract. This principle would not expand collective bargaining
rights to employees of businesses up and down supply and
distributional chains,215 but it would empower employees of certain
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See Glynn, supra note 211, at 232.
A more moderate expansion of firm responsibility to encourage controlling employer monitoring of
subcontractors is suggested by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s policy for the assignment of
responsibility for safety at multiemployer construction sites. The policy imposes duties on a controlling employer,
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subcontractors that work on the capital of other employers, even those
beyond the default boundaries set by alignment analysis. The capital
made productive might include intellectual property, including the
brand name of franchisors. If this view were adopted, franchisees could
become joint employers for purposes of collective bargaining, even if
not for other employment law.
Concluding Words
Arguments for expanding, or contracting, the range of enterprises
that have potential legal responsibilities under various employment
laws based on the purposes of the laws do not necessarily obviate the
need for general default definitions of employers and employees and
their consequent employment relationships. Such default definitions
may provide beneficial clarity and coherence if they can be derived
from a sufficiently compelling general principle or standard. This essay
attempts to elaborate and apply such a principle based on an insight
derived from the Anglo‐American common law of vicarious liability.
Whether the elaborated principle is compelling should turn not on
whether it reflects formal categories derived from the language of the
common law. Rather, the principle’s utility as a default standard should
turn on whether it provides proper incentives and a “just” and

administratively feasible assignment of responsibility for worker
protection and benefits.

